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SOVIET FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM

by

DENNIS N. GORESKY

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Soviet Federalism and Its Impact on the Nationalities Problem" submitted by Dennis Norman Goresky in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The study is concerned with analyzing the possible sources of the nationalities problem created by the Soviet form of federalism. Federalism was first introduced as a compromise form of government to allow for the diversity necessary to get the support of the different nationalities and yet provide enough power in the central government to ensure the creation of a strong and dynamic state. During the early years of Soviet rule it did appear as if both diversity and strength were being attained but, by the late 1920's, Soviet federalism had ceased to help solve the nationalities problem and had become an aggravant to it.

The first part of the study examines western and Soviet views of what constitutes a federal system. By examining the views of Lenin and Stalin, the relationship between Soviet federalism and the nationalities problem is explored. It is demonstrated that the Soviet form of federalism and federalism per se is responsible for further aggravating the nationalities problem. Soviet federalism, and particularly the form practised under Stalin, ceased to mirror or attempt to reconcile the aspirations of many of the non-Russian nationalities.

The remainder of the study examines how the daily workings of Soviet federalism are responsible for the continued national problem in the USSR. It is shown that the economic structures, goals, and development have come under almost complete all-union control and conflicting local or republican goals have largely been disregarded. This practice, based on political criteria for economic development, has often ignored more economically feasible plans for other regions. Although all areas of the Soviet Union have benefited from Soviet economic policies to some extent, the RSFSR has

continually been the major recipient of all economic development. As a result, the economic gap between Russian and non-Russian areas still remains.

The study concludes with a description of the goals and impact of Soviet socialization. Russification and sovietization have been determined to be the major goals inherent in the Soviet socialization process. However, in spite of the emphasis put on sovietization in Soviet propaganda and literature, it is revealed that Russification has become the dominant goal in practice. The study arrives at the conclusion that Russification and economic inequalities, two major elements of Soviet federalism, are responsible for aggravating the nationalities problem.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

All governments and states have applied certain accepted terms to describe the workings of their systems. Because the actual number of these terms is not very large, many states are categorized under the same heading. For this reason the terms used by different states may be the same, but the definition of the term and its application in the government of each state can be very different. For example, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Canada, and the United States of America are all federal democracies, yet each in its own way is different from the other two. The present paper will be devoted to the study of Soviet federalism. Its thesis may be stated as follows: It is the working of Soviet federalism and not federalism itself which serves to aggravate the nationalities problem. Because of its complexity the term federalism will be defined and discussed in greater detail below.[1] The problem of terminological confusion may be illustrated here by considering the term democracy. As used by western scholars, the term describes governments which are both representative and responsible to the electorate. The same term in the Soviet Union refers to the complete equality of all peoples in the economic, political, and social spheres of Soviet life. However, this equality can only be brought about if all the proletariat can be involved in the sharing of power. In addition, the question of responsibility is not necessarily involved. Cultural, historical, and ideological differences have contributed to the separate development of each system.

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1. This study deals only with Soviet and Anglo-American perspectives on federalism. For the many facets of federalism, see V. Earle, ed., Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Itasca: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968).

Unlike many established federations, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a federated state has been very recent. Although established less than fifty years ago, it has undergone changes which are more substantial than any in the history of this area. The Soviet state has been and still is the largest federation in the world and is today one of the world's two super powers. The country is now in a position where it could provide the material abundance necessary for the attainment of communism. It has solved its first major problem, economic backwardness, which was inherited from the tsarist regime. Consumer goods, education, and health services are now at the disposal of most of its citizens regardless of occupational status. This development and World War II have, however, required many sacrifices of the peoples of the union. The loss of life during the 1930's and the low priority given to agriculture have caused problems in morale, labor shortages, and low productivity among workers Even so, some policies of Soviet federalism have contributed much to the economic strength of the union.

A second major problem faced by the new state was the persistent nationalities problem. A number of attempts have been made to solve this problem, but to date it still remains. In fact, inequalities, created or maintained by rapid economic growth, tended to aggravate it. The strains on the system have been considerable, but such strains are not restricted to communist states. Conflicts of interest among the regions of a federal state are common, but because the USSR has so many nationalities, a regional problem easily becomes coterminous with and indistinguishable from the nationalities problem.

Delimitations of the Study

The purpose of this study is to isolate and explain Soviet federalism and its impact on the nationalities problem. The underlying assumption is that Soviet federalism must act in accordance with two seemingly contradictory goals. On the one hand, the Soviet Union has stressed the importance of being not only a federation of states, but also a union of many different nationalities. Each of these nationalities is guaranteed its right to exist within the social, political, and economic institutions of the Soviet Union. At the same time the Soviet Union is concerned about changing the old system, by force if necessary, to produce a strong and dynamic communist state capable of defending itself and its achievements. A number of states, including the Soviet Union, confronted with two such conflicting goals, have introduced a federal system of government. The Soviet leadership in the early years (as will be shown in Chapter I) in fact followed this reasoning for the establishment of a federal system. Although federalism may be used to reconcile such conflicting goals, this study will show that Soviet federalism has failed to do so.

Before we can explain the role of Soviet federalism in aggravating the nationalities problem, it is necessary to examine the theories which helped shape the present system and how it operates today. Chapter I will explore a number of the theoretical questions involved in the study. The initial problem to be examined is a definition of federalism as it is used in the west and in the Soviet Union. The comparative analysis of federalism will conclude with an evaluation of Soviet federalism using the model proposed by W. Riker.[2]

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2. W. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 11.

Chapter I will establish that within the Soviet theory of federalism there are two major and conflicting schools of thought, the assimilationists and federalists, each school having developed its own conception of federalism and what can be accomplished by its implementation. The rival schools have been advocating the merits of their particular theories since the time of Lenin and only by examining how the state does function can we ascertain which aspect of what theory is most widely implemented. The federalist view of the state was the one the non-Russian minorities accepted as the best way they could attain communism without losing their distinctive identities. Therefore, if the state is following the assimilationist view then it may be supposed that it is doing so against the wishes of the non-Russians. This then could be the reason why Soviet federalism has been unable to solve the nationalities problem.

The second part of the study, consisting of Chapters II, III, and IV, centers on the practice of Soviet federalism. The method and type of control used in the economy, the political sub-system, and the socialization agencies will be described. By including a discussion of the total polity, the goals and policies of Soviet federalism as they affect the nationalities policy will be elucidated.

Most of the examples used in the study are from the Ukrainian SSR. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, it is the contention of most writers that integration is most successful if the areas being integrated are similar in their ethnic, geographic, historical, and cultural features.[3] Since these features are similar in Ukraine and in Russia, the success or failure of integration of Ukraine into the larger Russian system may present

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3. K. W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1953).

clues as to the future of smaller and/or less similar national groups in the Soviet federation. Second, space limitations and the breadth of the Ukrainian topic require that the examination be restricted to Ukraine.

The study will not examine in detail a number of important considerations such as the federal-republic relations which result from: 1) the composition and control of the police or party; 2) the education reforms of the 1950's; and 3) the possibility and effectiveness of feedback on policies from the non-Russian peoples.

Most of the discussions pertaining to the effectiveness of central control or its future prospects (i.e. "Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984, and if so how?"[4]) have also been deleted from the study. These concerns are of paramount importance to a total understanding of Soviet federalism and the future of the Soviet system, but they can only be examined after one has isolated and described the forces of conflict in the system.

The Soviet economic system will not be evaluated on economic criteria alone because the latter would present only one side of the total problem. The economic benefits of the system will not be included in the study because their existence is not disputed and they are not as crucial as is their distribution. The distribution of wealth has become a contentious issue in all federal systems since unequal distribution accentuates inequalities.

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4. A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

Need for the Study

The most obvious need for the study is the very small number of works dealing with the impact of federalism on the nationalities problem in the USSR. While literature on national dissent in the USSR, written by the dissidents themselves or by western observers, touches on the impact of the federal system on the non-Russian nationalities, it is concerned with analyzing the problem from the perspective of dissent rather than federalism. In contrast, the present work is concerned with federalism as a possible cause for non-Russian dissent and is not concerned with the normative questions surrounding the dissent movement. The literature on integration may also eventually provide some additional information on the subject, but a systematic application to the Soviet Union has yet to emerge.

This study will also attempt to evaluate the growing volume of literature on Soviet federalism emanating from the USSR. It will be more than just a reply to Soviet propaganda; it will attempt to provide enough material for students of Soviet federalism to evaluate the scope and development of that federation.

As citizens of a federal state Canadians could analyze their policies in comparison to other federal states. Greater awareness of the alternatives may better equip them to resolve their own problems.

Review of Related Literature

There is no study of Soviet federalism which deals specifically with its impact on the nationalities problem. Attempts in this direction by Soviet scholars tend mainly to concentrate on theoretical questions and are very partisan. Lenin was one of the first Russian theorists to discuss

the nationalities question within the context of Soviet federalism.[5] Since his pronouncements in the early 1900's, the standard Soviet approaches have been confined to the theoretical and "scientific" proposals set down by Lenin.

During the Stalinist period, the official position on federalism and the nationalities problem was slightly different, but the standard terms of reference were still supplied by the theories of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by J. V. Stalin.[6]

After the death of Stalin there was a more regimented Leninist treatment of Soviet federalism. Works of Zlatopolsky[7] and others attempted to follow the guiding principles set down in the book Formation and Development of the USSR as a Union State.[8] Some writers are concerned only with presenting the official view on the formation and operation of the USSR. Others debate the future of Soviet federalism, its accomplishments and failures, and whether the present state system really follows Leninist principles.[9]

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5. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963). See Chapter I for volume and page numbers of citation.

6. J. V. Stalin, Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1955). See Chapter I for volume and page numbers of citations.

7. D. Zlatopolsky, State System of the USSR (Moscow: F.L.P.H., n.d.).

8. This book cited as the foundation for later works was written by D. Zlatopolsky and is referred to extensively. D. Zlatopolsky, Formation and Development of the USSR as a Union State (Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1954).

9. G. Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism," Soviet Studies, Vol. XVIII (April, 1967), p. 458-481.

Other less scholarly works such as Questions and Answers on the USSR[10] were published for propaganda purposes to show the internationalism, progress, and internal harmony of the USSR since 1917.

Most of the Soviet literature on federalism refers to the minorities question as if it had been settled years ago, or else assumes that the problems remaining are minor and can be resolved easily. In most of the writings it is evident that the situations or problems discussed tend to be centered more on explaining why the Marxist-Leninist solutions are correct than on why problems exist or how they can be solved.

Related non-Soviet literature is less abundant and tends to be less partisan. Almost all accounts of life or government in the USSR emphasize at least some part of Soviet federalism, although this usually is not their main purpose.[11] Many accounts written during or shortly after World War II tend to center on the theoretical concepts of Soviet federalism and are therefore very often distorted pictures because the reality of the system was not studied. R. Schlesinger's[12] and O. Janowsky's[13] books are two examples of this type of reporting. Both were left-wing socialist writing at a time when east-west relations were very cordial and their accounts

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10. The best way to describe this work is to see it as the "catechism" of the communist regime. The book is published under multiple authorship and the one used here was published in 1967. Questions and Answers on the USSR (Moscow: F.L.P.H., 1967).

11. Most books written on the USSR deal with specific concerns (e.g government of the USSR), and in so doing are actually describing part of the economic, social, or political forces that make up Soviet federalism.

12. R. Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1945), esp. Part IV and Chapter XVII.

13. O. I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1945).

were generally well received. As more information on the Soviet system emerged, their interpretation was shown to be erroneous. Other pro-socialist or pro-Soviet writers have written accounts on the USSR during the last two decades, but the scholarly value of some of them is very low.[14]

Better, less partisan accounts on federalism and/or the nationalities problem were written by Goldhagen,[15] Kohn,[16] Bacon,[17] Conquest,[18] and Bociurkiw.[19] Not all of them deal with the same problems or use the same suppositions, but each is well-documented and informative.

Other accounts by Zenkovsky,[20] Wheeler,[21] and Riker,[22] are not as well documented as the previous group, but each is a genuine attempt to describe actual conditions. Riker's book, for example, is excellent as a source for the theoretical aspects of federalism in general, but his

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14. For example, see I. P. Tsamerian and S. L. Ronin, Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR (Netherlands: UNESCO Publishing, 1962).

15. E. Goldhagen, ed., Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968).

16. Hans Kohn, Nationalism in the Soviet Union (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1966).

17. E. E. Bacon, Central Asians Under Russian Rule (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

18. R. Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967).

19. This author has written a number of excellent articles. The most notable will be listed as sources later in the work.

20. S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

21. G. Wheeler, Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

22. Riker, op. cit.

only reference to Soviet federalism is based on the superficial work by Schlesinger written in 1945. The book by Deutsch[23] remains the best account available on integration.

The preceding books are by no means a definitive list of works available on the subject, but they are all good examples of types of analyses currently being used to study the problem.

Definitions of Terms

The following are a number of terms which have been used in the study in the following manner:

Soviet: This term is synonymous with things about or pertaining to the Soviet Union and is not used in the restricted sense of "council;"

Nationalities: This term pertains to two groups of people: 1) ethnic groups such as the Ukrainians who have their own republic; or 2) groups such as the Jews without a native republic. Each group has a degree of cohesion stemming from its perception of itself as a people culturally, linguistically, and historically whether dispersed throughout the country or confined to a homogeneous territorial area;

Integration: A process by which at least two units combine to form a whole. The territorial units studied here are republics. The demographic units are nationalities;

Unitary: A form of government in which there is no division of powers between or amongst governments. The governing of the state therefore remains the prerogative of the central body, which controls all major government powers;

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23. K. W. Deutsch, op. cit.

Russianization: A series of policies directed towards promoting the use and acceptance of the Russian language, culture, history, and heritage at the expense of the non-Russian languages, cultures, histories, and heritages;

Russification: A set of policies encompassing Russianization but also including an attempt to alter psychologically the patterns of the non-Russians in such a way that they accept the established and existing Russian norms as their own. Russification is thus equal to total assimilation of the non-Russian peoples;

Nationalities problem: The expression of the belief of a nationality or number of nationalities, rightly or wrongly, that they as a group are being threatened and exploited for the benefit of some other group;

Federalism: A system of government which recognizes a division of power amongst different levels of government in the same state, with each level of government free in its own sphere of influence to act directly on the people under its jurisdiction.

CHAPTER I

THEORIES OF FEDERALISM

One cannot evaluate the effects of Soviet federalism on the nationalities problem without first exploring the meaning of federalism. The analysis of what western and Soviet scholars believe to be the characteristics of a federal state and the nature of the Soviet system will help clarify the term. By examining western theories of federalism it will become clear why Riker's theory is the best criterion to judge Soviet federalism. Since other federalisms have been examined within the framework of western theories and it has been shown that there are certain common features of these systems, it is best, from a comparative point of view, to examine Soviet federalism by the same criteria. Because the Soviet theory of federalism deals with autonomy in such a contradictory manner and since autonomy is the focal point of federalism, Soviet definitions are hardly adequate for an assessment of federalism. By evaluating the early Soviet theories of federalism this study will attempt to establish whether there is some attribute inherent in them which causes or aggravates the nationalities problem.

Western Interpretations

Since the end of the Second World War the literature on federalism has become more plentiful and more comparative in nature. With the creation of new federations in the developing world and with changes in some of the older federations, the term federalism is no longer used to describe one narrowly defined and cohesive type of system. The criteria for classifying a system as federal have been changing over the years but only an examination of certain criteria within a well-defined spectrum can

be used to determine whether a state is truly federal.[1]

Characteristics

The literature on federalism is extensive and the degree of sophistication of each work varies. For this reason the present analysis is limited to five widely quoted sources which appear to be the most authoritative on the subject of federalism. The five sources were also chosen because each helps to explain why the writer believes Riker's theory is best suited for evaluating the theory of Soviet federalism.

A. H. Birch divides federalisms into two classes, new or classical.[2] Under changes in the last few years, classical federalism has disappeared but its characteristics are still important to an understanding of modern federalism. The usual characteristics of classical federalism were: 1) a central government and a number of regional ones; 2) all governments acted directly on the people; 3) each government was limited in its sphere of action; and 4) governments were independent in their sphere of action.[3] Although the characteristics of modern federalisms are less numerous, they are similar to the classical ones.[4] New forms of federalisms are still characterized by the existence of one central government and a number of other governments in a distributive system of powers. Each government

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1. A. H. Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism" Canadian Federalism, Myth or Reality, ed. by J. P. Meekison (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968), p. 5. For an excellent account of other interpretations of federalisms see V. Earle (ed.) Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice (Itasca: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1968).

2. A. H. Birch, Federalism, Finance, and Social Legislation (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 305.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

still has its own sphere of powers but the latter are coordinated to act directly on the people. Because the theory of classical federalism proposed by Freeman and Dicey does not incorporate the above change, Birch suggests that his characteristics be accepted to describe contemporary federal states.[5]

K. C. Wheare also believes that federalisms have changed over the years and proposes a list of characteristics which are identical to Birch's.[6] Wheare discounts the question of residual powers, which Birch ignores, as an important characteristic of federalism. The characteristic of federalism inherent in these arguments is the existence of a division of powers amongst governments and not the specific power distribution itself.[7]

To A. W. MacMahon the characteristics of federal state are more specific than those introduced by other writers.[8] MacMahon believes federalism is a system of government with a substantial distribution of powers between two different levels of government. The central government must be in contact with the people, and the member states must have the power to change the form of government. A federation should also guarantee the equality of member states relative to their size, population, or other relevant criteria. MacMahon concedes that there are many types of federa-

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5. Ibid.

6. K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 11-15.

7. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

8. A. W. MacMahon, ed., Federalism Mature and Emergent (New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1962), p. 11.

lisms and the degree to which a state meets his criteria will determine whether a state is federal or not.[9]

E. McWhinney concerns himself with the legal issues of federalism and how they contribute to the different development of states.[10] The reason federalisms differ is related to the roles assigned to each level of government and to the effect the populace has in influencing each government.[11] For example, a "responsible government" will create institutions which can accommodate feedback from the people and these institutions will make the state structure radically different from that of a non-democratic nation, even though both systems will be based on a federal structure. Other authors such as W. S. Livingston take a sociological view of federalism.[12] To Livingston the distinction between a federal and a non-federal state is almost impossible to make since all states have, to some degree, federal characteristics.[13] Livingston's statement appears to render any study of federalism redundant but no conclusive evidence is offered to dismiss using the terms of federal (and unitary) to describe nation states. The major concern of his examination is to provide a classification of federal states rather than to describe the prerequisites of such a state. His work further points out the need for adequately defining federalism because both unitary and federal states share common features. This is the result of efficient government and not necessarily the erosion of either

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9. Ibid., p. 5.

10. E. McWhinney, Federal Constitution Making for a Multi-National World (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1966).

11. Ibid., p. 5.

12. W. S. Livingston, "A Note on the Nature of Federalism" Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality, ed. by J. P. Meekison (Toronto: Metheum Publications, 1968), pp. 20-30.

13. Ibid., p. 20.

unitary or federal principles.

W. Riker also offers a definition of a federal system.[14] A state is a federation if it meets three conditions. First, two levels of government must rule the same land and people. Second, each level of government must have at least one area in which it is autonomous. Third, each government must have some guarantee of this autonomy. It can be seen from these characteristics that Riker is concerned about providing a model broad enough to describe all types of federalisms. The characteristics are explicit, and not meaningless generalizations.

Each of the theories discussed indicates the importance of having an explicit set of characteristics which describe a federal state. Although many theorists have emphasized different crucial characteristics for developing an adequate classification, all contain a number of common features. Furthermore, the writers believe it is imperative not to call any country federal simply because it describes itself as such. In the opinion of the authorities discussed, the characteristics of a federal system are threefold. First, there must be one central government and a number of other governments acting on the same territory. Second, there must be a division of power which guarantees at least one area of autonomous action for each level of government. Third, there must be some guarantee of sovereignty or autonomy given to each level of government. A state possessing these three characteristics is a federal system and the manner in which it implements them determines the extent of centralization or decentralization. The preceding characteristics constitute the broadest criteria for classifying a federal state and are essentially a description of Riker's theory

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14. W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 11.

of federalism. Riker's all-encompassing theory is a synthesis of the other major theories of federalism and will be used in the study to evaluate Soviet federalism.

Soviet Federalism

Before evaluating Soviet federalism one must be familiar with the conditions of tsarist and Soviet Russia which confronted the Bolshevik leadership.[15] Lenin's and Stalin's interpretations of these problems are also important since government institutions were established under their leadership. After completing this background discussion the study will analyze the nature of modern Soviet federalism.

In the nineteenth century the Russian empire reached its greatest territorial limits. Within the expanded empire were over a hundred different nationalities. The census of 1897 showed that the Russians constituted less than 45% of the total population (Table I a). Throughout the nineteenth century the government attempted to subdue some of the more vocal nationalities hostile to Russian control. For example, the Polish independence movement was harassed by Russian authorities because it was in opposition to the central government's policy of subjugation and centralization.

During World War I other nationalities began to exert pressures for autonomy or independence. The Finnish, Baltic, and Polish attempts to gain independence from Russia influenced less developed movements, such as that of Ukraine. The failure of the Russian war effort and the advance of

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15. For a more detailed evaluation of the tsarist period refer to B. Dmytryshyn, USSR: A Concise History (New York: Scribner's, 1965); E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vol. I (New York: McMillan Co., 1951); R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 1-49.

TABLE Ia

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND IN THE SOVIET UNION IN THOUSANDS

	1897[a]	1926[a]	1959[b]	1970[c]
Russians	55,667.5	77,732.2	114,114	129,015
Ukrainians	22,380.6	31,189.5	37,253	40,753
Belorussians	5,885.5	4,738.2	7,913	9,052
Lithuanians	1,658.5	51.1	2,326	2,665
Latvians	1,435.9	141.4	1,400	1,430
Estonians	1,002.7	154.6	989	1,007
Moldavians[d]	1,121.7	283.5	2,214	2,698
Georgians	1,352.5	1,820.9	2,692	3,245
Armenians	1,173.1	1,565.8	2,787	3,559
Uzbeks[d]	1,702.8	2,440.9	6,015	9,195
Kazakhs, Kirghiz	4,285.8	4,578.6	4,591	6,751
Turkmens	281.4	427.6	1,002	1,525
Chuvashes	843.8	1,117.3	1,470	1,694
Poles	7,931.3	781.7	1,380	1,167
Jews	5,063.2	2,663.4	2,268	2,151
Germans	1,790.5	1,231.9	1,620	1,846
Tartars	3,767.5	4,898.8	4,968	5,931
Others	8,322.2	8,504.3	13,825	18,136
TOTAL	125,666.5	144,327.7	208,827	241,720

Sources:
a. R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 300-301.
b. Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleiia 1959 goda: SSSR (Moscow: Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlinie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1962), pp. 184-189.
c. Pravda (Moscow), April 17, 1971.
d. Each of these categories contain other nationalities from the same related groups. See Pipes, op. cit., pp. 300-301.

the German and Austro-Hungarian forces resulted in a further weakening of central control on many nationalities. With the overthrow of the Tsar in March 1917 the provisional government attempted to completely fill the resulting power vacuum. Throughout 1917 this government was increasingly unable to exert its comtrol over the empire which enabled different national movements to expand their control. From March to November of 1917 the provisional government continued the war effort and tried to prevent the empire from disintegrating.

Faced with a weakening central government the national movements began to demand more independence. For example, the Ukrainian Central Rada was ineffectual for some time because it was not representative. The failure of the government to grant the Rada's request for autonomy contributed to the broadening of support for the Rada. Confronted with a rigid government, the Rada eventually realized that only through independence could it implement policies advantageous to Ukraine.

The Bolsheviks were not associated with the provisional government's failures and were learning from their opponent's mistakes.[16] Prior to the revolution the tsarist government, the Bolsheviks and the other political parties all favored a strong unitary state, but in time the Bolsheviks realized that to gain power they would have to accommodate some of the wishes of the nationalities. When the Bolsheviks came to power they were the only party in the empire to have a program which combined the nationalities' aspirations and a program for a central government. This policy was a departure from both Marxist and Russian political thought of the time.

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16. For the period of the revolution and the changing Bolshevik reaction to the nationalities question refer to R. Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1967); Carr, op cit.; and Pipes, op cit., pp. 242-293.

Marx on the Nationalities Problem

K. Marx dealt sparingly with the question of the nationalities problem in a socialist state. In 1848 he maintained that the proletariat were internationalists and were no longer ruled by national chauvinism. The views of the Paris commune were later used as manifestations of this new internationalism. Marx did believe that in a capitalist society a national liberation struggle would be a progressive step, but with the destruction of capitalism the areas would be re-joined. The nationalities problem was seen as a method of breaking up the old order, but under socialism this nationalism would disappear. The formation of any socialist state was seen as a negative step because under it the establishment of a state was superfluous. Marx maintained the proletariat could join together without losing their distinct indentities.[17] Marx's theory did not advocate assimilation but was concerned with removing oppression which prevented the proletariat from uniting.

Lenin

Lenin devoted a considerable amount of his writings to the interrelationship of the nationalities problem, self-determination, and federalism in both tsarist and Soviet Russia. As a tactician of revolution, Lenin altered his theories to reflect the realities of a changing society, three of which will be discussed in this study. Above all Lenin considered

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17. Marx at no time advocated assimilation because he saw bourgeois culture disappearing within the proletarian movement and therefore no one culture would be dominant. The center of his theory was the expanding of the proletariat culture which bound the workers and not bourgeois culture which divided the movement. In the Communist Manifesto it clearly states that bourgeois culture will be replaced by the proletarian culture, thus one group need not worry about being forced to change to another bourgeois culture. L. S. Feuer, ed., Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959) pp. 23-26 and 41. Also see Conquest, op. cit., p. 15.

himself a Marxist and he therefore attempted to provide a Marxist explanation for the changes in his theory. At no time did he abandon the application of dialectical reasoning and each new course proposed was seen as a synthesis of competing theories. Accordingly, the study of Lenin's work is important not only because he was the first leader of the state but because all leaders after Lenin have adopted one of his proposals.

The Nationalities Problem

The major consideration of Lenin's writings on the nationalities problem was its relationship to revolution in the Russian empire. Prior to 1898 Lenin, like Marx, did not emphasize the importance of the nationalities question[18] because nationalism was seen as a bourgeois idea easily transcended. Lenin's writings in the second decade of the twentieth century indicated the first change in his theory. He still believed that nationalism was a creation of pre- and early capitalist societies[19] and that the proletariat would adopt socialist internationalism when freed from bourgeois societies.[20] The party program of 1917 which accepted the equality of nationalities[21] and Lenin's assertion that the Russian people should never forget that Russia was called the prison of the peoples[22] are indications of tactics and not shifts in policy. According to this

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18. R. Pipes, The Genesis of Soviet Nationality Policy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), p. 71.

19. Ibid.

20. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works Vol. XVI (Moscow: Progress Publishers and Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), p. 510.

21. R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky, (eds.), The Russian Provisional Government, 1917 Documents (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 318.

22. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XXI, pp. 102-103.

program, the nationalities problem was not to be over-emphasized but regarded only as one part of the revolutionary program.[23] It can be argued that Lenin's ideas were a realistic appraisal of conditions as they existed and the goal of establishing a unified super-national state was not altered. Furthermore, the changes can be seen as an attempt to gain recruits from the disenchanted minorities by offering a solution to their problem.[24] By expanding his base against the system, Lenin was convinced that tsarism could be destroyed. Furthermore, any concessions were eliminated by other declarations in the same program. Assimilation, for example, was heralded as a progressive step and many of Lenin's supporters amongst the nationalities began to question Lenin's aims. Another indication that this shift was more in terminology than in actual policy was the reiteration of the leading and unchallengeable role of the party. The nationalities were to have no power to act in their own interest but had to rely on the oscillating support of the Bolshevik party.

Although concessions Lenin made after the revolution were minor, they were a radical departure from previous theories. By limiting the concessions, Lenin was not disregarding the minorities but was attempting to utilize their discontent to alter the system. He also had become committed to the alteration of national inequalities once he attained power.

Self-determination

Once Lenin realized the causes of the nationalities problem and the power of some national movements, he proposed that it was in the interest

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23. Pipes, op. cit., Vol. XXI, pp. 54-55.

24. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XX, p. 451.

of the party to promote the idea of self-determination for all subjected states in order for the party to receive some support from the minorities. This declaration was the first time a Russian party, regardless of its ideological perspective, had allowed for the possible partial disintegration of the empire. Lenin's critics, such as Rosa Luxemburg, attacked the policy as being non-Marxist. Lenin explained it was not a switch in policy but an attempt by the RSDLP to cover all the combinations of events possible in the ensuing years.[25] V. V. Aspaturian suggests the reasons for its inclusion were four-fold.[26] First, Lenin wanted the nationalities to be less suspicious of the Bolsheviks and for them to view his party as champions of the nationalities' rights. Second, it would help to undermine the national bourgeois movements because the intellectuals' support might in turn go to the Bolsheviks. Third, it might accelerate the disintegration of the tsarist empire. Fourth, it was a subtle way of providing for the ultimate union of the national groups after the revolution. Lenin made it clear that he did not expect the nationalities to want independence because the proletariat would view only the establishment of a union of states as a progressive step.[27] He argued further that the granting of this right to the nationalities would not be used.[28] Self-determination was seen as an issue which all multi-national states had to recognize.[29]

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25. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 460.

26. V. V. Aspaturian, "The Theory and Practice of Soviet Federalism" Journal of Politics, XXII, (February, 1950), p. 22.

27. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XXII, p. 146.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

Unlike the Austrian Marxists, Lenin did not support the extension of national cultures in the same way because national cultures were seen as bourgeois entrapments which would be replaced by a proletarian culture.[30] The policy of self-determination was not meant to create new nation states but was to aid in eroding great Russian nationalism.[31] With the eradication of the bourgeoisie in Russia, the right of secession replaced self-determination as a state guarantee.[32] Lenin and the communist party believed that Russia in 1919 was the only country capable of establishing a socialist order and any call for secession was seen as a reactionary bourgeois phenomenon. Since the concerns of the central state (and party) were viewed as the only important ones, secession was not meant to be a real freedom.[33]

Federalism

Through Lenin's writings on federalism one can best see the development of his ideas. At first he disregarded any mention of the nationalities problem because he believed this problem would disappear when power was in the hands of the proletariat. In this period Lenin was concerned only with the establishment of a world socialist order, or, failing this, the establishment of a unitary state. Federalism and self-determination were two ideas Lenin found objectionable. In fact, prior to 1914 he ruled out federalism as an acceptable form of government.[34]

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30. Ibid.

31. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XIX, p. 501.

32. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XXVI, p. 176.

33. Ibid., p. 408.

34. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 328.

After 1914 Lenin no longer rejected federalism because even Marx had realized that in Ireland and Poland such a development would be progressive.[35] This change was a reflection of Lenin's growing awareness of the national question and the desires of the nationalities. This change in theory was also met with a refutation of the total assimilationist views he once held. Lenin had realized that the new Soviet state would only develop if it reflected the views of the people, and upon seizing power he called for the establishment of a federal state. This proposition was also intended to account for the division taking place and to help save the revolution.[36] Since republics like Ukraine were already asserting their independence in 1917, a call for a new federal system of government was an attempt to re-unite these lands. Lenin did believe that federalism was to be a transitional stage eventually to be replaced by a united workers state.[37] Aspaturian believes federalism is still referred to because it was formally institutionalized but in reality was never put into practice.[38] This idea is supported by reference to Lenin's views on the new state:

> ...the aim of socialism is not only to abolish the present division of mankind into small states, and all-national isolation, not only to bring the nations closer to each other, but also to merge (sliianie) them.39

After the civil war Lenin added the third major qualification to his theory of federalism. Lenin concluded it was great Russian chauvinism and not the protection of national differences which was the major threat

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35. Ibid., p. 486.

36. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XXVI, pp. 146-147.

37. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XXXI, pp. 146-147.

38. Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 29.

39. Lenin, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 270.

to the Soviet state. Though this new interpretation was viewed by many Bolsheviks with hostility because it allowed for a more decentralized form of federalism, it resulted in many non-Russians becoming involved in government and party functions and the republics were given some independent action. Lenin had changed his theory from one promoting a unitary state to one favoring a decentralized unitary state and finally to one supporting a fairly decentralized federal state. The assimilationists of his day were attacked as Great Power or Russian chauvinists.

Stalin

Joseph Stalin was the expert on the nationalities problem in the USSR until 1953. Prior to the revolution and until his death he controlled the nationalities policy in the USSR. Stalin attempted to legitimize his policies on the basis of Lenin's works even though these policies at times were very different. He defended the legitimacy of his theories by quoting Lenin's works written prior to the civil war and ignored those written later.

Once in power Stalin promoted both the economic and social integration of the Bolshevik state by allowing the party to use extensively force and propaganda. Unlike Lenin, Stalin attempted to clarify his program by defining the national question. The most striking characteristic of this definition is that it stresses the commonality of peoples and not the differences which could cause a problem. It became the party's official position to stress:

> ...the common conditions of the proletarians, on the unity of their interests, and on their national distinctions only in so far as these did not contradict their common interests....in

> what way do the proletarians of the different nationalities of Russia resemble each other, what have they in common...[40]

A definition of a problem which stresses the non-problem areas suggests it was meant to be used as a rationale for policies rather than a clarification of the problem.

National Autonomy

Stalin never considered the creation of separate nation states from the old tsarist empire as a valid policy alternative; instead he supported autonomy for the different nationalities. He viewed the idea of a disintegration of the empire as a bourgeois reaction which had to be eradicated.[41] In accordance with this view, Stalin announced this policy after the revolution: "One cannot merge nations or national languages by decree from above because they possess an extraordinary stability and tremendous power of resistance to assimilation."[42] He believed the actual autonomy granted to the republics did not need to be too extensive as long as the nationalities' language rights were guaranteed. The national states themselves could be liquidated but the national languages were to remain.

Self-Determination

Stalin's writings on self-determination can best be seen as a four-level argument, each level being dependent on the preceding ones. First, the question of self-determination would have to be evaluated on the basis

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40. J. Stalin, Collected Works, Vol. I, (Moscow: Progress Publishers and Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), pp. 36-37.

41. J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (New York: International Publishers, 1950), p. 8.

42. Stalin, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 53.

of the situations facing the country at a specific time, and if problem were not allowed to develop, the question would not be raised. A successful agricultural policy was seen as the most crucial factor which could prevent this problem from occurring.[43] Second, Stalin put self-determination into this context:

> Nations have the right to arrange their affairs as they please.. nobody can (nobody has the right to!) forcibly interfere in the life of a nation. But that does not mean that Social-Democrats will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations and against the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty of Social-Democrats to conduct such agitation and to endeavor to influence the will of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the way that will best suit the interests of the proletariat.[44]

In clarification Stalin said the interests of the proletariat came first and self-determination is legitimate only to this end.[45] Third and most important, only the communist party has the authority to decide when the question of self-determination can be raised. Fourth, self-determination can only be decided upon by the communist party in a democratic state.[46] With the qualifications offered by Stalin self-determination ceased to be a freedom because the nationalities no longer had the right to decide how or when they would become free.

Federalism

Initially Stalin and Lenin agreed federalism was not the best form of government for the proletarian state but after 1917 both men changed their views. Federalism was next seen as a progressive step towards the re-

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43. Ibid., p. 25.

44. Stalin, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 270.

45. Stalin, op. cit., p. 53.

46. Stalin, op. cit., p. 55.

building of a more powerful nation.[47] Stalin accepted federalism only as a transitional form of government leading to the creation of a unitary state.[48] However, since many states were already independent, any reference to federalism could be seen as an attempt to reconsolidate the empire.[49] Stalin defended his view as being consistent with Marx's theory because the nationalities problem was larger than expected and harmful secession had already occurred (e.g. Ukrainian independence).[50]

The most confusing aspect of Stalin's theory is his use of the terms autonomy and federalism because both possess the same characteristics.[51] The only difference in the terms is that federalism is a temporary phenomenon while autonomy is permanent.[52] Stalin said there were also varying degrees of autonomy, the highest form being a republic voluntarily placing itself directly under Moscow's control. This high degree of centralization was also one of the characteristics of Stalin's definition of federalism. Federalism and autonomy were therefore two methods by means of which states could voluntarily unite to form a highly centralized state.[53] The only real difference was that a federal state could secede from the union, but an autonomous state did not have that right.[54]

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47. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
48. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
49. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 367.
52. Stalin, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 371.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.

Stalin's view of federalism is futher clarified in his reply to two Austrian socialists, Bauer and Springer.[55] They believed a socialist state must be founded on the principle of centralization and must be integrated in all respects except culturally. Stalin attacked their theory as being non-Marxist, not on the question of centralization, but because of the recognition of national cultures. Stalin said culture has no meaning to the proletariat but was rather a bourgeois phenomenon.[56] Federalism in this frame of reference is not a system of state government but is a term used to explain the merging of different states to form a unitary one. Stalin, therefore, was not interested in supporting a practicing federal state but maintained the use of the term for its value connotations.

Stalin's view of national autonomy, self-determination, and federalism coincided with Lenin's views prior to 1917 but the policies he implemented during the 1930's showed that Stalin followed an assimilationist view of Soviet federalism.[57] After Lenin's death his pronouncements on the theories of federalism were closer to a description of a unitary state. These assimilationist policies of Soviet federalism were a resurgence of Great Power chauvinism Lenin had attempted to destroy.

The communist party had altered its theory of state structure as a response to pressures from the nationalities. Lenin saw that the national

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55. Stalin attacked both men's views of the Bund as they described it. O. Bauer, The National Question and Social-Democracy (Vienna, 1924). Renner, Karl, Der Kampf der Osterreichischen Nationen um den Staat (Vienna, 1902).

56. Stalin, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 54.

57. This interpretation is also held by Conquest, op. cit., p. 55.

question would remain if the Bolsheviks attempted to establish a unitary state and subsequently a number of concessions to the nationalities were implemented. Many national groups disliked outside control and wanted some degree of autonomy. The leadership response was to propose the establishment of a federal state in which the different units of the state were to have an autonomous sphere of influence. As a guarantee of autonomy the Soviet state was the first to allow, even in principle, the right of self-determination.

Federalism was established as a response to the national question and the nationalities' request for autonomy, and it remains in the constitution because the question remains unsettled.

Soviet Writings on Federalism

Since the late 1950's a variety of works on Soviet federalism has emanated from the USSR.[58] Today the future of Soviet federalism remains uncertain since there has not been a recent examination of Soviet federalism sanctioned by the state. However, an "open" discussion in official publications is examining the whole question of Soviet federalism and it therefore appears certain the leadership is divided on its future.[59] To understand this discussion it is necessary to begin by examining some early criticisms of Lenin's views and then discuss the characteristics of Soviet federalism. Finally, by examining the current discussions on

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58. For one of the best analyses on this subject refer to G. Hodnett, "The Debate Over Soviet Federalism" Soviet Studies, Vol. XVIII, (April, 1967), pp. 458-481.

59. Ibid., p. 481.

federalism one will be able to ascertain why Soviet federalism has failed to solve the nationalities question.

Early Critics of Soviet Federalism

Many of Lenin's contemporaries attacked the establishment of a proletarian state because they feared what would be practiced under Soviet federalism. The critics questioned the theoretical concept of Soviet federalism from their own left-wing perspectives. All of them attempted to refute Lenin's ideas and apply their Marxian interpretations to Ukraine.

Dmytro Dontsov, referred to as a non-Bolshevik Marxist, argued for an independent Ukraine and attacked all the Russian parties for their views on Ukraine. Lenin in turn attacked him as a bourgeois nationalist and a danger to the proletariat. Dontsov's argument rejected Lenin's ideas on federalism and self-determination because he believed they would not be implemented and were being used to falsify the struggles in Ukraine. He said the struggles were between two nations, Russia and Ukraine, and Lenin's attempt to describe the conflict as an ideological one was a continuation of tsarist policy.[60]

Yurkevich, a left-wing Social-Democrat, attacked the Bolshevik policies because he believed the new Russian regime was operating on the basis of an assimilationist theory. Yurkevich stressed the national awareness of the Ukrainian people and their legitimate request for Ukrainian particularism to flourish. He rejected Lenin and Stalin's writings as being disguised

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60. Quoted in I. Mazepa, Bol'shevyzm i Okupatsiya Ukrainy (Kiew: M. Gankevych, 1922), p. 80.

policies for the centralization of power and the assimilation of non-Russian peoples.[61]

In time Dontsov and Yurkevich abandoned their left-wing positions and joined the more moderate critics of the system. Two other Ukrainian Marxists who attacked Lenin's idea of the new state, however, retained their ideological positions and apparently their opposition to the system until their deaths.[62] Serhei Mazlakh (disappeared during the purges) and Vasyl Shakhrai (executed by Denikin's forces) combined in 1919 to write the pamphlet On the Current Situation in the Ukraine as a challenge to Lenin's intentions in Ukraine. The pamphlet begins by attacking the bourgeois government in Ukraine and foreign intervention. The authors attacked the Allies on their one-Russia stand and then attempted to show that the Bolsheviks were no different. They said Lenin only thought of one indivisible Russia, controlled by Russians, and the right of self-determination was meaningless. Since the Bolsheviks were not helping the Ukrainian struggle, they began to question Lenin's intentions. Mazlakh and Shakhrai believed the new state would submerge Ukraine and the new federation would pursue a new assimilationist policy. A Russian communist in 1928 complained about the forced migrations because in Ukraine the rural - urban split became a Russian - Ukrainian split, as it had been under the tsars.[63] Mazlakh and Shakhrai's forecasts thus appeared to be true.

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61. Jury Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine (Stockholm, 1960), pp. 86-88.

62. S. Mazlakh and V. Shakhrai, On the Current Situation in the Ukraine, ed. by P. J. Potichnyj (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970).

63. P. Fedenko, "Liberation Abroad and Colonialism at Home" Studies on the Soviet Union (1965), p. 174.

All of the Ukrainian critics mentioned attacked Lenin as an assimilationist and were skeptical of Bolshevik policies. After 1922, however, Lenin realized that by following assimilationist policies the nationalities problem would be increased and the state itself would suffer.

Characteristics of Soviet Federalism

In legal terms, Soviet federalism is characterized by the following criteria: 1) the state is indivisible; 2) there is uniform citizenship; 3) higher organs set up structures vested with authority over the whole state; 4) there is uniform tax collection; and 5) there is a centralized diplomatic corps for the state.[64] These characteristics are the same in western federalisms as well, not because these states are all federal but because these features are common to all states having a central government. Thus both federal and unitary states possess these characteristics. No western author would assume that these are characteristics of a federal system.

In theory Soviet federalism has remained the same over the last thirty years. Schlesinger's book, written in 1945, and Zlatopolsky's book, written in 1964, are identical on all crucial issues. The theoretical basis of Soviet federalism is still Lenin's writings on the subject. Changes in the system must still be explained within the context of Lenin's theory of the state.

The modern definition of Soviet federalism begins with the statement "the USSR is a union state and not a union of states"[65] This reference to a union state presupposes that the territory and national groupings are

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64. D. Zlatopolsky, State System of the USSR (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House), p. 72.

65. Ibid., p. 9.

indivisible. To further complicate this problem of definition, federalism is referred to as a union of several states to form a single unit and the examples given are the RSFSR and the USSR.[66] Finally, the parts of these units are all sovereign nations and are equal.[67] However, according to the Soviet constitution these parts of the unit are not alike because only the union republics can secede, have diplomatic relations, and so on.[68] The definition offered by Zlatopolsky is meaningless because it is a negation of the Soviet constitution.

Although the Soviet definition of federalism is different from the ones used in the west, many characteristics of the systems are the same. Soviet federalism in theory recognizes the existence of the territory governed by one central government and many regional governments. Each government has its own independent sphere of power and acts directly upon the people it governs. Using Zlatopolsky's discussions on federalism one would suggest that Soviet federalism conforms with Riker's definition of a federal state in all respects, but the question arises as to whether federalism is in fact allowed to operate.

Current Situation

To determine how Soviet federalism has operated it is necessary to examine the recent Soviet views on the role and future of federalism in the USSR. At present the major controversy is between the pro- and

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66. Ibid., p. 8.

67. Ibid., p. 71.

68. Refer to articles 15 through 18b and articles 89-93 of the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

anti-federalists. Before engaging in an evalutation of the present controversy, it is necessary to understand the conditions which immediately precede it.

Although many of the concerns of the controversy are similar to those Lenin discussed, the death of Stalin was the start of a new appraisal of federalism. The era began with official pronouncements contrary to those given over the last years of Stalin's rule. Reference was made to the different nations and nationalities in the Soviet Union and to the fact that the nationalities problem was not solved. The prevalent theme of the early years was that there was a flourishing of nations (rastsvet) in the union and that all people had free access to their own languages and rich cultures. The CPSU was praised as the protector of the non-Russian's rights because under its guidance the nations developed, heritages were expanded, and written languages were given to those who had not previously had them.[69]

By the late 1950's the general mood of official pronouncements changed and reference was then being made to the coming together of nations.[70] This coming together (sblizhenie) was seen as the direct result of the successful policy of flourishing of nations.[71] The differences between nations were seen as losing their significance because they were embarking on a new era of cooperation. These types of statements continued until the proposed education reforms were made public. The

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69. Hodnett, op. cit., pp. 465-468.

70. G. H. Hodnett, "What's in a Nation" Problems of Communism, Vol. XVI (September - October 1967), p. 2.

71. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

hostility of the nationalities to the proposed reforms of 1958 were met with sanctions imposed on the dissidents. During the course of the discussions one observed a few references to the merging of nations (slianie) but the major emphasis remained on the flourishing and merging of nations without effacing (stiranie) national differences.[72]

The first real official public statement pertaining to the future course of public policy was revealed at the Twenty-Second Party Congress.[73] At this congress, in 1961, a number of important statements were incorporated into the Party Program. The education reforms and the party program indicated that the nationalities question and the whole federal structure had been re-evaluated and a new course of action had begun. The most important sections of the program dealt directly with the nationalities and by implication with the federal structures. One of the most important pronouncements of the congress was the statement of the coming together and merging of different nationalities. The boundaries within the Soviet Union were described as losing their significance. With the increased growing together of nationalities, they were seen as being superfluous. The coming together and merging of the different nationalities was one of the most important policies of the congress. Reference was also made to the parallel development of different languages and cultures which would eventually develop into one language and culture for the state. The base of this new order was to be Russian because of the increased use and value

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72. Hodnett, op. cit., p. 458.

73. Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Vol. II (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), pp. 115-118.

of that language.[74] Since that party congress, the debate has been between the pro- and anti-federalists.

Defenders of the federal state say that through federalism the Soviet Union has accomplished many tasks set down by Lenin and that only if the state continues to function as it has will all the problems be solved. Men like Semenov and Kulichenko support this position because they believe only federalism can eradicate the nationalities problem.[75] Opponents of this view dismiss the existence of the nationalities problem and believe the separateness guaranteed by a federation is no longer necessary.[76] The common view held by both groups is that with the elimination of the nationalities problem federalism becomes superfluous. Federalism is seen as the procedure by which the Soviet state can emerge as a unified, homogeneous unit. The disagreement is not on the goals or procedures of Soviet federalism but rather on how many goals have been attained.

Because the pro-federalists believe that the nationalities problem and nationalities still exist in the Soviet Union, they continue to refer to the flourishing of nations within Soviet federalism. But, they also admit that the nationalities are coming together (sblizhenie) without effacing (stiranie) national differences. The pro-federalists support the progressive integration of peoples in one unit for the benefit of all as long as the different groups exist.

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74. I. E. Kravtsev, Razvitie Nationalnykh Omhoshenil v USSR (Kiev: Izdamel'stvo Akademii Nauk USSR, 1962), pp. 70-86.

75. Hodnett, op. cit., p. 467.

76. Ibid., pp. 463-464.

The anti-federalists, however, perceive the situation differently. To them federalism accomplished the coming together of people and the gradual eradication of national differences. Since this process has been completed it is time for the merging (sliianie) of nations.

Although both groups emphasize an assimilationist view of Soviet federalism, there is in essence a continuation of the conflict between Leninist and Stalinist policies. The profederalists continue to see the possibility of different nations existing within the USSR. Federalism is the method by which these different groups can exist and in time merge for their mutual benefit. This Leninist view is, however, opposed by a more doctrinarian Stalinist line which attempts to nullify the existence and future of national uniqueness. The question of a federal versus unitary form of government has therefore continued to be an integral part of the discussions on the Soviet state.

Soviet Federalism: An Appraisal

The historical development of Soviet federalism is an important consideration for students of federalism and the nationalities problem. Many of the ideas formulated by Marx, Lenin, and Stalin have been expanded, modified, and institutionalized into the Soviet state. Because the theory of Soviet federalism has been altered little since its inception, one can extract insights into the present form by referring to Lenin's writings. National opposition to Soviet federalism has also continued until the present. Attacks like those in the pre- and early Bolshevik era continued for many years until the liquidation of dissenters in the 1930's by Stalin. During the purges of the 1930's Stalin almost succeeded in the destruction

of the dissident national intelligentsia. The void created by his actions has, in many cases, been filled by Soviet-educated personnel. Because many of these persons have become the new dissident national intelligentsia, it can be assumed that the problem is not solved.

The discussion of Soviet federalism has also shown what meanings Soviet theoreticians place on their statements. Much of their literature was provided for propaganda purposes and consequently the stress was on the theories' democratic appearance. At times there was a dichotomy between what was said in theory and what was reported in actual events. It is this dichotomy which makes the theory confusing and at times contradictory. For example, each republic is guaranteed the right of secession but it is also stressed that the territory of the USSR is indivisible. Although the creation of separate states is not a characteristic of federalisms, the fact that one part of the theory nullifies another part poses the problem of which statement to analyze.

Many western accounts on Soviet federalism have come to the conclusion that the system is not a true federalism. An examination based completely on theory would provide a different interpretation than one which examines the practice of the state as well. K. C. Wheare applies one of the more comprehensive analyses on the nature of the Soviet system.[77] He states that if one examines the Soviet constitution, excluding articles fourteen and nineteen, the state is too decentralized to make an accurate classification possible. By including the two articles in an examination, his conclusions are very different. The amount of power bestowed on the central government by articles fourteen and nineteen are, in his opinion,

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77. Wheare, op. cit., p. 14.

more characteristic of a unitary government. Because of this contradiction in the constitution most western accounts do not characterize the Soviet Union as a "true" federal state.

C. Friedrich also expresses the idea that the USSR is not a genuine federal system because of the powers held by the CPSU.[78] Article 126 of the Soviet constitution gives a monopoly of power to the party which is organized on a centralized and unitary basis.

The official Soviet theory of federalism appears to conform with the three conditions in Riker's definition. However, there are a number of qualifications and conflicts between the constitution and the theory which indicate that these conditions do not exist in practice. For example, the all-pervasive role of the party negates the existence of at least one autonomous sphere of power vested in the republics. Because the system does not meet all the requirements of the most general theory of federalism it is obvious that the USSR is not a federal state. In terms of most western theories of federalism, the Soviet Union can only be described as a highly centralized quasi-federal state and not as an example of federalism. The Soviet definition of federalism does not guarantee the autonomy the nations of the USSR want. Therefore it is the present system which leads to the nationalities problem.

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78. C. Friedrich, "New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice" Systems of Integrating the International Community, ed. by Elmer Plischke (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 71.

CHAPTER II

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET FEDERALISM

Because the major activities of the Soviet political organization and its administrative arm revolves around economic considerations, it is necessary to begin the analysis of the functions of Soviet federalism within the framework of its economic structure. In the Soviet Union political influence has continually been an integral part of its economic life and economic criteria have been overshadowed by political objectives. To determine which objectives are stressed by its leadership, it is necessary to begin the analysis with the budgets. Above all, the budget provides information on the daily detailed implementation of policy decisions which will help to assess the role of Soviet federalism and its impact on the nationalities question. For the purpose of this examination we will separate the discussion of the budget from the structures involved in planning economic investment. This chapter is concerned only with isolating the goals of Soviet federalism as they are revealed in the budget allotments. Because allocations are not consistent with the principles of equality desired by the nationalities, an examination of budgetary and economic indicators will isolate the areas which have been singled out by critics among the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The reference to the budget in this chapter is to the final document which forecasts the yearly income and expenditures in the USSR. It must be remembered that the budget is carefully and laboriously compiled because it allocated all resources available for development. It initiates all economic activities such as industrial development throughout the Soviet Union. Through it one can follow the allocations made

from the central budget to the requblics and from the republican budgets to the lower economic or administrative units. An examination of the budget is also important because the allocation in most federal states has led to a confrontation between component parts of the system about the equality of the distribution of the benefits of the system. Although no federal state distributes its economic benefits equally, most do attempt to provide as equitable a distribution as possible.[1] If the Soviet leadership, which has the greatest control over its economic system of any leadership in the world, does not distribute its benefits equally or else does not distribute capital to more productive non-Russian areas, then we can assume that these policies are detrimental to solving the nationalities problem. Accordingly, even without determining the normative implications of equal or proportional distribution of resources, we can isolate a factor in the role that Soviet federalism plays in aggravating the nationalities problem.

The examination of the budget in the USSR will concentrate on the major budgetary items. Although the budgets of the USSR and Ukraine will be the only ones examined in more detail, most of the tables listed include all republics. In this manner the effect of the budgetary allotments on the economic well-being of the republics can be shown. We can also discover the relation of all income generated in the republic to the amount which is subsequently distributed beyond its jurisdiction.

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1. The purpose of this study is not to determine if equal distribution is necessary or even desirable but to show that inequalities can lead to problems. These difficulties are evident in many countries both federal and unitary alike as, for example, Quebec and the Maritimes in Canada and even within units such as states or provinces. The major thrust of this argument is that equality is desired from most governments and its failure to respond can create problems.

The major problem faced by western scholars in dealing with Soviet statistics is that the latter reflect concerns which are different from those in the west. Authors such as Pryor talk about the GNP of the Soviet Union but Soviet statistics on the combined social product are not synonymous with those of the western GNP. For example, non-productive labor such as teaching is excluded in their computations.[2] Futhermore, comparative studies involve the computation of the total value of production into one standard measurement and this may not reflect the scarcity of a product when its price is not stated in the cufrency of the country involved.[3] All these problems make an evaluation of Soviet production difficult because of an unfamiliarity with the different forms of measurement.[4] However, these difficulties will no longer occur if we use statistics compiled only in the Soviet Union or those allowing for the differences in computing statistics.

Another difficulty in dealing with Soviet budgetary figures is the absence of certain information because crucial data is either hidden or is classified material. Neither the exact amount of money extracted in various taxes from the component republics nor the amount returned to each republic is shown. On the question of the reliability of certain Soviet statistics, Dzyuba says they are made to appear in the best light for the central government.[5] Nevertheless, in the absence of other documented statistics, we are forced to rely on those published by the Soviet authorities.

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2. H. Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 121.

3. F. L. Pryor, Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Nobleton: Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., 1968), pp. 60-61.

4. Sherman, op. cit., p. 120.

5. I. Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1968), p. 107.

The statistics reported by the United Nations are also open to further enquiry.[6] These statistics for both the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR were tabulated by the central statistical agency of the USSR.[7] These statistics are just republished accounts of the statistics submitted to the United Nations and are not checked by them. Because there is no neutral agency for the evaluation of statistics, Dzyuba's contention about their bias may well be true.

The two major sources of data, I. Dzyuba, a Soviet social critic,[8] and Holubnychy, a western economist,[9] also appear to have their own biases. Both men attack the subservient position of the non-Russian republics under Soviet federalism, using Soviet sources as their major frame of reference, yet neither of the two gives any indication of the merits or advances of the system. This does not mean they do not recognize the progress the system has made, but they contend that the negative aspects of the system outweigh its merits. Their contention, however, requires evidence as it is too crucial a position to be assumed so readily.

Since the budget provides the funds for economic development, it is also necessary to understand that there are a number of peculiarities indigenous to the Soviet Union which are not found in most other industrialized countries. These differences are in fact most accentuated

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6. United Nations, The United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1967 (New York: 1969).

7. D. Zlatopolsky, State System of the USSR (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964), p. 81

8. Dzyuba, op. cit.

9. V. Holubnychy, "Some Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), pp. 50-120.

when one compares the two super-powers. Of all the industrialized countries, the Soviet Union has relatively the smallest urbanized population, totalling 48% in 1959 and 56% in 1970.[10] This latter figure corresponds to that of the U. S. in 1940.[11] In density the Soviet Union has only 10.4 people per square kilometer but almost three-quarters of the people live in the central and southern parts of the European USSR.[12] The centralized budget in the USSR also differs from that which is prevalent in the market economies since it involves more hierarchies, provides a more binding plan of government spending, collects and reports different statistics, and channels more money through its economy.[13] Soviet budgets, therefore, reflect different geographic and economic factors not prevalent in industrialized western economic systems.

The Budget

Legally the budgets are the responsibility of both the central and the separate republican governments.[14] The constitution provides the central government with the task of coordinating government expenditures in the USSR, but the republican governments are also given the power to control their own budgets. In many other areas, such as foreign relations, the possibility of this dual responsibility has been overshadowed by the

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10. Pryor, op. cit., p. 31.

11. W. H. Young, Essentials of American Government, 9th edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 6.

12. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1969 godu (Moscow: Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1970), p. 11.

13. Pryor, op. cit., pp. 44-48.

14. Zlatopolsky, op. cit., p. 82.

powers actually appropriated by the central government. Outwardly, this has not been the case with the responsibility for the different budgets although certain writers question the real power behind the budgets.[15] To illustrate this point, Table Ib shows that throughout the years 1958 to 1967 the Ukrainian budgetary expenditures are not in a constant ratio to those of the all-union budget. During this period significant ministerial changes occurred with a consequent shift in power without any alteration in fund allocations. One would expect that if ministries were to be abolished at the republican level and the power of those ministries appropriated by the central government there would be a shift in funds from the republican to the all-union level. Because these changes did not occur, the republics may still retain the responsibilities given in 1965 to the all-union government even though their ministries no longer exist. On the other hand the fact that these reforms were promoting greater centralization, the absence of any change in the financial structure may indicate the republics never had the power, and the abolition of the ministries was just a reorganization of structure which no longer conformed to the realities of the situation.

In Table Ib some examples of the unequal distribution of funds are apparent. Though Ukraine has one-fifth of the population of the USSR its budget accounts for only one-tenth of the total central budget. (The Ukrainian budget is included in the USSR budget.) This inequality is not necessarily an indication of disparity because certain duties are performed

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15. Specific reference is made to the books written by A. L. Melnyk, Soviet Capital Formation: Ukraine, 1928/29-1932 (Munich: Ukrainian Free University Press, 1965);
Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 44-48.
S. O. Olynyk, "Soviet Federalism in Theory and Practice" (unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1965).

TABLE Ib

UKRAINIAN BUDGET EXPENDITURES IN PERCENT[a]

Expenditure	1958	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
National Economy	58.0	52.0	50.9	51.0	51.2	51.0	48.3
Education	17.9	20.4	21.1	21.4	21.4	22.0	22.6
Public Health	10.5	11.1	11.1	11.2	11.2	11.5	12.2
Social Assistance	..	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4
Social Insurance	10.4	12.1	12.2	12.5	12.6	11.8	12.9
of which							
State Social Ins.	9.5	10.8	11.0	11.3	11.4	10.8	11.8
General Administration	2.6	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7
Other Expenditure	0.7	1.9	2.3	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.9
TOTAL	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.7	100.0
As % of USSR Budget	9.6	9.2	9.3	9.2	8.8	9.5	9.1

TABLE II

USSR BUDGET EXPENDITURES IN PERCENT[a]

Expenditure	1958	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Education	13.4	15.1	15.7	16.4	17.2	17.7	17.9
Public Health Social Security	19.9	20.1	19.9	19.8	20.4	20.9	21.1
Defense	14.6	15.5	16.0	14.4	12.6	12.7	13.1
Other	7.0	5.4	3.8	5.4	5.6	5.9	5.2
National Economy	45.1	44.0	44.6	44.0	44.2	42.8	42.6
TOTAL	100.0	101.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9

[a]Source: The United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1967 (New York, 1969), Table 194.

solely by the central government. The military, for example, is financed and controlled by the central government and therefore defense spending is not included in the Ukrainian budget. However, if one takes into account its wealth and also the expenditures the republic does not have to make, the discrepancy in the proportion of union to republic budgets is still very great. The difference suggests that the wealth, which is not accounted for, is going into the central budget for distribution. If this is the case, then the key to understanding the economies of the republics is the distribution of funds from the central budget. In a society which claims to be egalitarian, this process of spreading the wealth to all areas would explain why Ukraine should be helping the less developed areas of the USSR. On the other hand, if the less developed areas are not the only ones benefiting from this distribution of wealth, the Soviet federalism is not functioning as a real egalitarian society. If the various nationalities in the USSR perceive that benefits should be distributed differently from what they are at present, this could be one reason why Soviet federalism aggravated the nationalities problem.

Major Budgetary Items

In article 76 of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the USSR is given the power to direct but not to control the allocations in the central and republican budgets.[16] Because of this role of the central authority, it is necessary to determine what pressure the central government can exert on funds administered by the republics. To accomplish

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16. Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 58.

this task one must examine the major items in the different budgets and ascertain where control affects republican powers.

Military spending in the USSR averages to about 14% of the central budget (Table II) and employs about 2.19% of the population of the USSR.[17] These funds include the military expenditures for recruitment, training, and maintenance of troops. The development of new warfare techniques and military research were not included in this figure.[18] In Pryor's calculations the level of expenditure per factor price of GNP decreased from 12.3 in 1956 to 9.4 in 1962.[19] Although these figures were the highest in his survey, he concludes that the difference in expenditure was not really significant. Though the ultimate control of all military forces in the USSR is in Moscow[20], Pryor maintains that the military is controlled by the central government in all federal states in his survey and that the only difference in the sample countries is the degree of influence the central government has over the police forces or local militia.[21] The expenditure on these forces is not included in the statistics because it is difficult to extract the figures from the budgets. Some of the military funds are spent in the different republics by the troops stationed there but because the armed forces are those of the USSR as a whole, the final responsibility for utilizing the forces rests with the central authority.

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17. Pryor, op. cit., p. 101.
18. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
19. Ibid., p. 91.
20. Zlatopolsky, op. cit., p. 83.
21. Pryor, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

Health and welfare are the responsibility of both the central and the republican governments and therefore are included in both budgets. The people in the USSR are the recipients of the highest per capita expenditures in the world in health and welfare as most of the services are provided free to all citizens. Consequently, all of the people of the USSR benefit from the services provided. Public consumption in health and welfare expenditures was 9.4% in 1956 and 10.6% of the total GNP in 1962.[22] In 1958 19.9% of the central budget and 20.9% of the Ukrainian budget were devoted to these services. In 1967 the corresponding figures for the two governments rose to 21.1% and 25.5% (Tables Ib and II). Although the location of the expenditures in not available, the magnitude of these allocations indicates that there has been a considerable expansion in social services in all parts of the USSR. However, because the decisions of all central ministries are binding on the republics, some services required by the republics could be delayed or permanently pushed back through the dictates of the central government.

Education is also the responsibility of both levels of government. In 1962 the school-age population, from five to 14.9 years of age, constituted 16% of the total population of the USSR. Enrolment of school-age children in 1962 was 87% and the ratio of one teacher to twenty pupils was the average in all republics.[23] In 1956, 14.8% of the student population were receiving higher education but this number rose to 15.9% in 1962.[24] Expenditures on education totalled 4.13% of the GNP in 1962.[25]

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22. Pryor, op. cit., p. 175.

23. Ibid., p. 192.

24. Ibid., p. 195.

25. Ibid., p. 200.

In 1958 the central government spent 13.4% and the Ukrainian republic spent 17.9% of their total budgets on education. By 1967 these figures had risen to 17.9% in the central budget and 22.6% in the Ukrainian budget (Tables II and III). Education in all of the USSR follows a common curriculum and pupils use the same textbooks, but instruction may be given in the different languages of the USSR.[26] Dzyuba is highly critical of the educational system in Ukraine and the rest of the USSR because the directives from the ministries have created a system which does not reflect the realities and aspirations of the republics nor allow for their autonomy.[27] As an example of this policy, Dzyuba states that only 21% of the schools in Ukrainian cities have Ukrainian as their language of instruction,[28] and yet they are contributing a large amount of their revenues to both the central and the Ukrainian budget which finances education. In Poland, where allocations from the Ukrainian SSR are not made to the Polish budget, the Ukrainians have their own schools and newspapers.[29]

Other major budgetary expenditures are research, national economy or economic development, and transportation and communications. Research and development accounts for 1.58% of the union budget and the directions and areas in which this research is to be made is determined by the central government.[30] Transportation and communication are two related expendi-

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26. J. Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Continuity and Change" in Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 122-124.

27. Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 109-111 and p. 157.

28. Ibid., p. 157.

29. Ibid.

30. Pryor, op. cit., p. 267.

tures which are under the central government's supervision. An examination of rail lines shows a number of spur lines terminating in areas containing either manufacturing or extracting industries. Main railway lines converge on the industrial centers of Moscow, Leningrad, and the upper Volga region, all of these areas being in the RSFSR. The major railways within the Ukrainian republic are linked with the three major industrial areas in the north. Ukrainian industrial areas are only tied to the Asian areas through Moscow and not by the shorter route which could be taken by running the lines straight east. The route through Moscow is not the most economically feasible but makes Moscow the central receiving and distributing centre and thus essential in intra-republic trade. Since Moscow is the capital and the largest city, one would assume that it would be accessible from all parts of the union but not to the extent of contributing to economic inefficiency. This can also be claimed to reflect a policy stressing the continued dependence of the republics on Moscow.

The largest budgetary allocations of both the central and republican governments go into the national economy which includes the amount of capital expenditure allotted in the budget for housing, reconstruction, development, and capital investment.[31] The average amount invested for development from 1958 to 1967 was 43.9% from the central budget and 51.8% from the Ukrainian budget (Tables Ib and II). Since there is no private investment in the Soviet Union, these figures represent not only present

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31. United Nations, The United Nations Statistical Year Book, 1967 (New York: 1969), p. 684.

priorities but they also are an indication of the level of economic output possible in the future.

In spite of the fact that the Ukrainian SSR appears to be allocating tremendous sums for its own development, problems of economic disparity have not been alleviated. The control of funds allocated by the budgets rests primarily with the central government because the central government, through its ministries and directives, can influence the allocation of the republics' funds. In all of the major budgetary items the Ukrainian expenditures must conform with and be closely supervised by the central government.

Economic Disparities

Because economic disparities can result from unequal resource allocation it remains to be determined whether the republics are receiving a "fair" share of the national wealth. A lack of such funds would result in an absence of new industries, and economic disparities of a region would increase rapidly in proportion to those areas receiving the funds. The disparities can manifest themselves in a number of ways, some more pronounced than others.

Urbanization is one of the main indices of testing economic well-being. Urbanized societies have higher living standards and more industrial output which sells for higher prices than agricultural goods. In 1918 Ukraine and five other republics were more urbanized than the RSFSR, with Latvia being the most urbanized. By contrast, only Estonia was more urbanized than the RSFSR in 1970. In fifty-two years there has been rapid urbanization in most areas of the USSR but the most rapid growth has been in the RSFSR and not in the already more urbanized republics or

in the Asian republics.[32] Since the populations in the Asian republics are expanding faster than in the European republics, it would appear that more policies directed at Asian urbanization are necessary.

Dzyuba contends that the position of Ukraine in the Soviet Union is a precarious one because it has been delegated the responsibility of being the major food producer (25% of the agricultural production of the USSR) and is thus purposely kept from developing industrially.[33] The rationale of this is that the Russian republic has been allowed to urbanize faster than other areas and therefore it has more industries with higher paying jobs. As a result, inputs into the Russian budget are 56.7% from industry and 15.9% from agriculture while in Ukraine 47.9% is from industry and 26% is from agriculture. According to Dzyuba, even the present expenditures on industries prevent Ukraine from developing as rapidly as it could because investments are for the extracting rather than for refining industries.[34] In spite of the fact that some large-scale development is occurring, the management of such developments disregard the people and the land they are modernizing. Even when new jobs are available, the top echelons of control fall to the non-Ukrainian managers and directors who are brought in. These people's loyalties therefore tend to be to the hierarchy by which they are engaged and not to the aspirations or future of areas in which they work.

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32. Narodnoe Khoziajstvo SSSR v 1969 godu (Moscow: Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSR, 1970), p. 11.

33. Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

34. Ibid., pp. 96-112.

The figures and arguments Dzyuba makes about the economic development or exploitation of Ukraine raise some further considerations. An examination of the budgets indicates that there is a net outflow of capital from Ukraine and with it the control associated with investment is also being transferred to the central government. The position and types of major enterprises are centrally planned and thus a republic's authority becomes secondary to that of the central government.

If the present economic trends are continued into the future, the non-Russian republics will remain less developed than the RSFSR. Economically, the Russian republic appears to be the recipient of more of the benefits in Soviet federalism but it must be remembered that all parts of the RSFSR do not share equally.[35] The tables related to this discussion provide the statistics on all the republics of the USSR but the major focus will be on the statistics of the Russian republic, the average of the non-Russian republics, and on Ukraine.

An examination of the per capita investment of state and cooperative enterprises from 1918 to 1960 clearly shows the privileged position of the Russian republic (Table III). By making the expenditure in Russia a constant index of 100, not one republic has had as great or greater per capita expenditure over the years 1918 to 1960. The average for non-Russian republics was 66 and for Ukraine it was 68.6. Only in the cases of Estonia in 1946 to 1960, Azerbaidzhan 1933 to 1940, and Tadjikistan 1918 to 1932 was the per capita investment in a non-Russian republic above that of the Russian republic. The central Asian republics seem to have

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35. For example Kiev and Kharkov receive more benefits from the union than any rural area in the RSFSR and more than most cities.

TABLE III

PER CAPITA CAPITAL INVESTMENTS OF STATE AND COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES, 1918-60

Republics	1918-32 Index	1933-40 Index	1941-60 Index	1946-60 Index	1918-60 Index
RSFSR	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ukraine	97.2	59.7	69.1	70.8	68.6
Belorussia	61.0	32.4	43.4	45.1	42.9
Uzbekistan	67.5	51.5	41.5	41.3	41.5
Kazakhstan	..	88.3	95.7	97.3	90.5
Georgia	..	85.5	62.4	62.6	64.7
Azerbaidzhan	..	126.9	89.8	92.0	92.5
Lithuania	..	..	..	45.6	..
Moldavia	..	..	..	32.3	..
Latvia	..	..	..	71.5	..
Kirghizia	..	50.9	52.1	52.8	49.8
Tadjikistan	111.6	64.7	48.8	49.9	50.0
Armenia	..	90.4	59.8	60.8	60.7
Turkmenia	93.4	82.6	85.8	86.8	83.2
Estonia	..	..	..	105.1	..
Average for non-Russian Republics	89.0	63.0	66.8	66.9	66.0

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 77.

the largest per capita expenditure outside of the Russian republic. Considering the need for establishing industries east of the Urals and the large population growth in the area after the war, these figures are not as large as could have been expected. These republics also receive many Russian and Ukrainian settlers and it is impossible to determine which groups benefit most in these republics.

The table on the per capita investment in industry for 1918 to 1960 indicates why the non-Russian republics are not being industrialized as quickly as the Russian republic (refer to Table IV). V. Holubnychy places the per capita investment in Russia at 100 and only Azerbaidzhan has had more per capita investment than the Russian republic. The average investment for the non-Russian republics is 63.7 while Ukraine's is 72.6. Since Ukraine has more money invested in industry than eleven of the other republics, and, at the same time, was not being allowed to develop to its full potential, it is apparent that the central government is keeping most of the republics underdeveloped and becoming more reliant upon the RSFSR. In the meantime, the RSFSR has continued to receive the largest investment allotment.

The population of the RSFSR is 54.3% of the total RSSR population and yet it receives more than 65% of the total capital investments (refer to Table V). Because of this disproportionate investment, the non-Russian republics receive only about one-third of the total investment allocations even though they account for nearly one-half of the population. In the years 1956 to 1960 the Ukraine received only 4% less of the total capital than it would have received on a proportionate allocation based on its population figures. Although Ukraine did not receive as much as the RSFSR, it was the major non-Russian recipient of benefits nonetheless. In spite

TABLE IV

PER CAPITA CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN INDUSTRY, 1918-60

Republics	1918-40 Index	1941-60 Index	1946-60 Index	1918-60 Index
RSFSR	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ukraine	87.5	73.1	75.1	72.6
Belorussia	24.0	30.4	32.0	28.7
Uzbekistan	38.5	36.7	35.9	35.8
Kazakhstan	78.8	73.9	74.7	70.9
Georgia	71.1	57.3	58.5	58.2
Azerbaidzhan	174.0	105.2	108.8	111.4
Lithuania	..	..	37.2	..
Moldavia	..	..	23.6	..
Latvia	..	..	47.0	..
Kirghizia	29.8	49.0	50.0	45.5
Tadjikistan	34.6	42.2	43.3	40.3
Armenia	81.7	57.9	59.3	58.4
Turkmenia	42.3	77.9	78.9	72.5
Estonia	..	..	83.2	..
Average for non-Russian republics	76.0	63.6	62.8	63.7

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 78.

TABLE V

SHARE OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS IN TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, 1928-60
(in per cent)

Republics	1928-32	1933-37	1938-41	1941-45	1946-50[a]		1951-55	1956-60
RSFSR	67.8	69.5	69.7	73.5	(61.2)	62.7	66.3	65.5
Ukraine	18.5	16.6	14.4	12.3	(20.7)	19.2	15.8	16.1
Belorussia	2.0	1.4	2.3	1.0	(2.9)	2.3	1.9	2.0
Uzbekistan	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	(1.6)	1.9	1.8	2.0
Kazakhstan	3.3	3.4	3.5	4.7	(3.7)	3.7	4.8	6.5
Georgia	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.5	(1.7)	2.0	1.6	1.1
Azberdaidzhan	2.1	2.5	2.6	1.5	(2.5)	2.5	2.5	1.6
Lithuania	..	..	0.1	0.2	(0.6)	0.5	0.6	0.8
Moldavia	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	(0.5)	0.5	0.5	0.5
Latvia	..	..	0.2	0.3	(0.9)	0.9	0.7	0.8
Kirghizia	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	(0.5)	0.5	0.7	0.6
Tadjikistan	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	(0.5)	0.5	0.6	0.6
Armenia	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.5	(0.6)	0.7	0.6	0.6
Turkmenia	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	(0.7)	0.8	0.8	0.7
Estonia	..	..	0.5	0.2	(1.5)	0.9	0.7	0.6
Non-Russian republics combines	32.2	30.5	30.3	26.5	(38.8)	37.3	33.7	34.5

[a]The figures in parentheses represent the share assigned to the republics under the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Note that the RSFSR actually received more than was allocated to it by the Plan.

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 82.

of this fact, Holubnychy's theory that the Russian republic is the major benefactor of resources and development in the Soviet Union is substantiated.[36] Furthermore, the allocation of funds to the RSFSR bears no relationship to the marginal productivity of capital nor to the profit extracted from investments. In the years 1959 to 1963, the profit on investments in the Russian republic was 14.9% and the average for the non-Russian republics was 15.9% (refer to Table VI). In this period the profit in Ukraine was 17.6% and the area in which the largest profit was extracted, that of Latvia, had received one of the lowest allocations of funds for capital development. It is apparent that profitability is not one of the major determinants in the budgetary expenditures of the central government. The output per industrial worker was the lowest in the RSFSR and yet this is the area in which a major proportion of the funds were allocated.

In 1965 the average monthly salary of a worker in the RSFSR was 98 rubles and in the non-Russian republics it was 91.7 rubles or 93.6% of the Russian salary (refer to Table VII). If the per capita personal disposable income of the RSFSR were placed on an index scale at 100, then the average for the non-Russian republics would be 73.7 (refer to Table VIII). In addition to having a larger salary and a larger disposable income, the Russian worker has accumulated more savings per capita than workers in any other republic. The average per capita savings in the Russian republic

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36. V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 104

TABLE VI

CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY AND PROFITABILITY IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS

Republics	Marginal Capital Product in Industry (Per Cent Growth of Output Divided by Per Cent Growth of Investments) 1933-41	1954-62	Profit on Investments 1959-63 (in per cent)	Profitability Index
RSFSR	2.40	0.78	14.9	100.0
Ukraine	2.47	0.92	17.6	117.8
Belorussia	2.14	0.89	20.8	139.2
Uzbekistan	0.80	0.53	14.1	94.2
Kazakhstan	1.49	0.70	2.2	15.1
Georgia	2.79	1.11	14.7	98.2
Azerbaidzhan	1.24	1.21	11.6	78.8
Lithuania	..	0.63	19.2	128.9
Moldavia	2.44	0.57	28.8	193.2
Latvia	..	0.63	31.2	208.8
Kirghizia	1.10	0.70	12.8	86.0
Tadjikistan	2.41	0.57	11.7	78.4
Armenia	1.69	0.89	14.6	97.6
Turkmenia	1.15	0.67	7.2	48.3
Estomia	..	0.45	16.9	113.2
Average per cent of profit in non-Russian republics			15.96	

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 91.

TABLE VII

AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS, 1940-65
(in current, local rubles)

Republics	1940	1950	1955	1960	1965
RSFSR	35.1	65.9	73.6	82.5	98.0
Non-Russian republics combined	29.0	60.0	67.6	75.9	91.7
As percent of RSFSR	82.6	91.0	91.8	92.0	93.6

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 94.

TABLE VIII

PER CAPITA SAVINGS IN BANKS OF THE SOVIET REPUBLICS, 1940, 1958, and 1964
(in current, local rubles)

Republics	1940	1958	1964
RSFSR	4.91	49.91	82.75
Ukraine	2.32	37.38	63.84
Belorussia	1.92	24.72	48.30
Uzbekistan	2.66	20.19	27.24
Kazakhstan	2.37	27.71	44.99
Georgia	3.46	38.87	60.50
Azerbaidzhan	2.47	23.79	33.82
Lithuania	..	21.98	44.08
Moldavia	..	17.46	27.48
Latvia	..	36.88	69.89
Kirghizia	2.29	26.04	38.74
Tadjikstan	3.40	20.62	29.98
Armenia	2.34	30.64	60.60
Turkmenia	3.68	24.27	34.82
Estonia	..	40.68	87.98
Average for non-Russian republics	2.69	27.94	48.01
As % of RSFSR	54.8	56.0	48.0

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 96.

was 82.75 rubles and that of the non-Russian republics was 48.01 rubles, or 58% of the Russian figure (refer to Table IX). The larger savings in the RSFSR are not the result of fewer products being purchased because more items are available in Russian cities than in the other republics and therefore the sales in 1955 showed that total revenue subject to taxation in the non-Russian cities was 74.9% of that in the Russian cities.[37] The Russian worker makes more money and therefore spends more on a larger variety of goods than does a worker in a non-Russian republic. However, the larger salaries and numbers of products available to the Russian city worker are not necessarily available to all workers in the RSFSR.[38] Although the average worker in the Russian republic has a higher standard of living than does his non-Russian counterpart, the central government allocates more funds for government housing in the RSFSR than it does in all of the non-Russian republics, with the exception of Kazakhstan (refer to Table X). In most non-Russian republics, privately financed housing exceeds the proportion in the Russian republics.

The data from the preceding tables indicates that through the Soviet budget, allocations of resources to the different republics are not consistent with the principle of equality. This factor in itself is not atypical of federal states because it occurs in most, but what is atypical of this system is the relationship between the have and have not areas.

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37. Ibid., p. 81.

38. The rural--urban inequalities have been isolated by many people as one of the problems confronting the Soviet state. M. Suslov, "Obshchestvennye Nauki-boevoe Oruzhie Partii v Stroitel'stve Kommunizma" Kommunist (No. 1, 1972), p. 20.

TABLE IX

PER CAPITA OCCUPANCY OF NEW URBAN HOUSING UNITS IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS, TOTAL FOR 1951-60

Republics	Built at Government Expense		Built on Credit and at Private Expense	
	Square Meters	Index	Square Meters	Index
RSFSR	351	100.0	121	100.0
Ukraine	230	65.5	141	116.5
Belorussia	241	68.7	165	136.4
Uzbekistan	174	49.6	185	152.9
Kazakhstan	417	118.8	208	171.9
Georgia	188	53.6	107	88.4
Azerbaidzhan	192	54.7	87	71.9
Lithuania	205	58.4	88	72.7
Moldavia	157	44.7	138	114.0
Latvia	259	73.8	73	60.3
Kirghizia	172	49.0	225	185.9
Tadjikistan	185	52.7	99	81.8
Armenia	200	56.9	120	99.2
Turkmenia	221	63.0	114	94.2
Estonia	228	64.9	62	51.2
Average for non-Russian republics	251	71.5	149	123.1

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 101.

TABLE X

PER CAPITA PERSONAL DISPOSABLE INCOME (BEFORE TAXES) IN THE SOVIET REPUBLICS, 1940, 1958, AND 1964
(in current, local rubles)

Republics	1940		1958		1964	
	Rubles	Index	Rubles	Index	Rubles	Index
RSFSR	121	100.0	449	100.0	589	100.0
Ukraine	90	74.4	341	75.9	468	79.4
Belorussia	71	58.7	273	60.8	397	67.4
Uzbekistan	91	75.2	291	64.8	341	57.9
Kazakhstan	77	63.6	364	81.1	466	79.1
Georgia	105	86.8	333	74.2	404	68.6
Azerbaidzhan	102	84.3	277	61.7	326	55.3
Lithuania	..	..	307	68.4	459	77.9
Moldavia	..	..	237	52.8	328	55.7
Latvia	..	..	511	113.8	682	115.8
Kirghizia	72	59.5	288	64.1	367	62.3
Tadjikistan	79	65.3	275	61.2	326	55.3
Armenia	94	77.7	305	67.9	408	69.3
Turkmenia	113	93.4	339	75.5	381	64.7
Estonia	..	..	530	118.0	734	124.6
Average for non-Russian republics	89	73.5	333	74.2	434	73.7
Average for non-Russian republics excluding Baltic republics and Moldavia	89	73.5	309	68.8	388	65.9

Source: V. Holubnychy, "Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Pub., 1968), p. 97.

On the average the Russian republic receives the greatest amount of funds and services provided from the budget and at the same time the RSFSR has the lowest productivity per worker and the lowest return per ruble invested. While western federations attempt to help less developed and economically less viable units, Soviet federalism is set up to inject resources into the most prosperous but least efficient unit. From the view of economic efficiency the large allocations to the RSFSR would be best used had they been injected into the economy of the other more dynamic republics. If the RSFSR contributed the same proportion of its wealth into the central budget as Ukraine and other republics did, then to develop more rapidly and in more inaccessible areas it must have received as much or more capital back for investment from the central government. The "have/have not split" cannot be explained in terms of available resources because Ukraine, Moldavia, and most of the other republics still have the capabilities and resources to expand much more rapidly than they have done. The have/have not split has become a Russian/non-Russian one where economically the more viable units have received less allocations than is warranted by economic or egalitarian considerations. According to Melnyk this characteristic of Soviet economic policies had manifested itself even in the 1930's when he attempted to prove that Ukraine was exploited by the central government.[39] He showed that from 1928 to 1932 30% of the revenue generated in Ukraine was extracted by the central government and was spent elsewhere. To Melnyk this indicated Ukraine was being exploited as a colony.

In more recent times, writers like I. Dzyuba argue the central government's policies are as discriminatory today as they were in the time

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39. Melnyk, op. cit.

described by Melnyk. Dzyuba refers to the fact that until 1958 Ukraine did not compute its own national income or national product. Until this time, and to a lesser degree now, most of Ukraine's economic statistics were either hidden or released according to the directives of the central government in Moscow.[40] The problem of ascertaining the extent to which the ultra-centralism benefits or hinders the Ukraine is, in Dzyuba's words, very difficult:

> What ultra-centralism brings to the Ukraine it is impossible to calculate in detail because of that same secrecy or neglect regarding statistics. To such 'uncharted areas' belongs the production achieved in the Ukraine by enterprises under Union jurisdiction. It is also impossible to determine exactly how much of the revenue which the Republic hands over to the Union budget (and much more is handed over than is left) returns through redistribution and how much is spent on centralized organizations, establishments, and enterprises.[41]

From accounts in the 1960 budgets, Dzyuba states that 72.3% of the turnover tax collected in Ukraine was transferred directly to the union budget.[42] Because the Soviet state is governed according to the principle of democratic centralism, which is more centralist than democratic, the republics themselves have no control of higher organs of power and thus have no control of funds extracted from them.[43] In conjunction it should be remembered that Dzyuba refers to the 72.3% figure as one intended to portray a better situation for Ukraine than really exists.[44] What this

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40. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 105.

41. Ibid., p. 106.

42. Ibid., p. 107.

43. The contention that democratic centralism is more centralist than democratic is held by most objective observers of the Soviet state, notably A. G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 154-155.

44. Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 106.

evaluation means is even if the accounts are biased in favor of the all-union position, the figures themselves show Ukraine is being exploited. In the book The National Income of the Ukrainian SSR, the official figures show Ukraine received 1113 million rubles through distribution from the central budget but had put 5288.8 million rubles into the budget.[45] Dzyuba argues the balance in favor of the union budget in 1959 was 3886.7 million rubles, in 1960 4175.8 million rubles, and 1961 3664.8 million rubles and in addition to this loss of revenue, the union republics, including Ukraine, deliver products to areas designated by the central government at prices below cost.[46] In terms of the 1960 allocations, Dzyuba argues Ukraine received little of its inputs back from the central government.

Although the non-Russian republics, in some ways, are suffering economically from the present union, they do receive many economic benefits as well. Within the union they all have access to larger markets and to a larger variety of goods. There is a greater number of industries, places, and jobs which can be filled by the different peoples. They have a common pool of scientific and technical knowledge which can be applied to bettering their economic positions. In total the benefits of the system are impressive especially when they are compared to many of the neighboring countries in the underdeveloped world. A comparison between the benefits and limitations of the system are, however, beyond the scope of this study and do not directly contribute to an understanding of the impact of Soviet federalism on the nationalities problem. What is of importance is that within Soviet federalism inequalities amongst the republics occur

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45. As quoted in Dzyuba, op. cit., p. 107.

46. Ibid., p. 107.

and that men like Dzyuba recognize these inequalities and call for the end of the privileged position of the RSFSR. Since the books written by Kolasky and Dzyuba were published, many statistics indicating the disparities have ceased to be published.[47] This response indicated an attempt to stifle the manifestation of discontent and not its cause. What really is at stake is that a federal state ceases to be representative without some equity or accepted formula for economic redistribution. Because Ukraine has not received a "fair" share of the national wealth, and this fact is being recognized by many Ukrainians, it adds more irritants to the nationality problem and is bound to increase resistance at the local level.

Because it is difficult to determine the number of critics of the system who follow Dzyuba's position, it is not possible to predict the impact these criticisms have on the system. What can be determined is that if present trends in budgetary expenditures are continued, the discrepancies between the Russian and the non-Russian republics will increase. By promoting a policy of unequal growth and development it is possible the nationalities problem will be intensified.[48] This is possible because with the widening of the gap between the have and have not areas it will become more evident that the RSFSR enjoys a special position. Even some Soviet writers such as Shilyuk have realized this problem and have excluded most of the comparisons with the Russian republic when discussing the gains made in the non-Russian republics. This inequality and the special status of the RSFSR in Soviet federalism has therefore contributed to the growth

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47. Dzyuba, op. cit., and J. Kolasky, Education is Soviet Ukraine (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates, 1968).

48. Olynyk, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

of the nationalities problem. Certain non-Russian critics have isolated these factors in the budgets and are using them as examples of where changes in the economic sphere of Soviet federalism must occur for federalism to represent the principles on which it was founded.

CHAPTER III

CONTROL OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AND ITS EFFECTS

To further explain the role of Soviet federalism as an aggravant to the nationalities problem it is essential to understand the effects of the economic system upon it. As was shown earlier economic problems are not restricted to command type economies nor for that matter to federal systems. What is unique about Soviet economic problems is that they can have political effects as well because regional disparities can coincide with the borders of non-Russian areas in the state. Sound economic policies are therefore necessary for they can either accentuate or alleviate the three major problem areas facing the state which according to M. Suslov are: a) the nationalities problem; b) the urban/rural split; and c) the white collar/blue collar relations.[1] In order to isolate the major reasons for the economic disparities and uneven growth under Soviet federalism it is necessary to examine the processes involved in its economic development. In the last chapter we were concerned only with the final budgets and determining where funds were being allocated. It is now imperative to examine who controls the structures producing both the budgets and the plans.

Before beginning to examine the hierarchy of control in the Soviet economic structure it is useful to review the four characteristics of Soviet

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1. The first two of these problems are more directly included in this study as there is a definite correlation between the two. It can be assumed that the third problem is also linked with the other two but because of insufficient data to support this link it has been excluded from the analysis. For a discussion on these problems see M. Suslov, "Obshchestvennye Nauki-boevoe Oruzhie Partii v Stroitel'stve Kommunizma" Kommunist (No. 1, 1972), p. 20.

federalism developed so far which have or can aggravate the nationalities problem.[2] These are as follows:

1) Soviet federalism is highly centralized and therefore little, if any, control is allocated to local authorities;

2) Urban industrial areas are multi-national while rural areas remain settled by the national groups of the respective republics;

3) Each republic has been assigned a specialized role in the economy and the industrialization of many non-Russian areas is kept below that of the RSFSR;

4) The RSFSR receives the major benefits from the budget allocation even though it is not the most economically efficient republic.

It can be argued that all four characteristics are just a reflection of the problems inherent in all developed states, and that the area of the RSFSR was already the base of industrialization during the tsarist period. Since it had an abundance of resources, it could be expected to continue as the most developed. If it is argued on economic criteria alone, these problems are not unique nor are they insurmountable, but on the basis of the theory of Soviet federalism and the aspirations of non-Russians in the Soviet Union, they are indications that Soviet federalism has failed to create its own goal of an egalitarian society. These problems are therefore indicators that the system has not been successful in attaining its primary economic and social goals.

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2. A. G. Avtorkhanov, "The Underdeveloped Countries in the Soviet Empire" Studies on the Soviet Union ed. by B. Iwanov (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1965), p. 187.

Budgetary Process

The lines of authority in the budgetary system of the Soviet Union allow for all decisions on the composition of the budget to be determined by the upper echelons of power in the Soviet Union. Legally the ultimate control of the budget rests with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which allocates funds to the lower levels of government. In practice, however, this function has been assumed by the party structures and other organizations in the government. Schwartz assumes that all decisions are made at the apex of the Soviet federal structure because the line of control is hierarchical and because all budget allocations must be made by the central government.[3] Since republics must submit their budgetary requests to the central government for ratification, the control of the economic system is a responsibility of the central government.[4]

Diagram I is a representation of the central governments control of the planning and formulation of a budget. Prior to the fiscal year, the different levels of the budgetary organization are furnished with production guidelines formulated by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. With these guidelines, the lower levels of the budgetary structure consider their possible expenditures for the next year and submit their requests to the Council of Ministers. Having received the proposed budgets of the republics, trade unions, and local authorities, the central government then becomes responsible for the construction of an all-encompassing budget. With the Minister of Finance rests the final authority for the coordination of all the different proposed budgets into one central budget. Throughout

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3. H. Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin (New York: J. P. Lippincott and Co., 1965), p. 488.

4. D. Zlatopolsky, State System of the USSR (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), p. 103.

DIAGRAM I

THE BUDGETARY PROCESS


Council of Ministers of the USSR
Minister of Finance
Guidelines for preparing budget
Department of Government i.e. ministry
Guidelines to those below
Council of Ministers of Republics
Central Council of Trade Unions
Budget Estimates
Prepare Budget of Social Insurance
Individual Ministries in Republics
Council of Ministers of Autonomous Republics
Local Soviets
Their Budget
Minister of Finance of the USSR
Control and Integration of Individual Budgets and Construction of Total Budget
State Planning Commission (Gosplan)
Examine the Budget
Council of Ministers of the USSR
Examine the Budget
Supreme Soviet
Listen to Budget: Ratify It
Council of Ministers of Union
Council of Ministers of Nationalities
Soviet of Union
Soviet of Nationalities
Enact the Budget
Budget

Source: W. Markert, Sowjetunion Das Wirtschaftssystem (Köln: Bölhau Verlag, 1965) p. 246.

this procedure the State Planning Commission, commonly known as Gosplan, reviews the allocations to determine their feasibility and, if necessary, makes alterations in consultation with the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The budget ratified by the Supreme Soviet may go through many changes from its initial conception, but the ultimate control of the structures and the budget itself are determined directly by the party's directives.[5] Diagram II is a representation of the budgets of the lower levels of government which are incorporated into the final budget.

The office of the Minister of Finance is extremely crucial in the formulation and the execution of the budget. Most of the preliminary work is either performed or supervised by this office. All data necessary for the completion of the central budget is, in the course of time, examined in detail by the Ministry. Only the Ministry of Finance has sufficient information about the actual amount of money necessary and available in the forthcoming year to be able to coordinate the allocation of funds throughout the economy. The Minister of Finance is responsible for the formulation of the rough plan of the budget and its submission for scrutiny by Gosplan, the Council of Ministers of all the republics, and especially the central government. With the final recommendations of Gosplan, the Minister, in consultation with his colleagues in the central government, submits the final document for ratification by the Supreme Soviet.

As the above indicates, the actual coordination of the budgetary system rests entirely with central agencies. The party, the central government, Gosplan, and the Ministe. of Finance in particular all have a tremendous influence on its formulation. Moreover, though the republican

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5. V. Katoff, Soviet Economy 1940-1965 (Baltimore: Dangary Publishing Co., 1961), p. 246.

DIAGRAM II

COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL BUDGET



This Diagram is a representation of the Soviet practice of incorporating all lower budgets into the higher ones. In this way the total budgetary expenditures for a given year are all incorporated and expressed as a function of the one central budget.

Source: W. Markert, Sowjetunion Das Wirtshaftssystem, (Köln: Bölhau Verlog, 1965) p. 243.

bodies are responsible for providing information from which the central government might formulate the forthcoming budget, the central government relies on its own agency, Gosplan, to provide corroborating statistics on the needs of the various republics. The different republics, which embody the national groups or minorities, have no real control in budgetary matters.

Recently there has been some indication that republics are playing an increasing role in both their own and in central budgets. Both Katoff and Zlatopolsky state that in the past few years over fifty percent of the total USSR's budgetary allocations are under the responsibility of the different republics and are therefore within the republics' jurisdiction.[6] These authors claim the republics now have more control of their day to day expenditures, but they do not challenge the fact that the central apparatus does retain most of the power over the actual spending of money which may not be directly or legally under its control. For example, this is done through the State Bank, which itself is subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It releases credits only for the expenditures listed in the budget. In this way the central government, through the State Bank, retains a day-by-day and month-by-month control over jurisdictions legally under republican authority.[7] Sherman refers to the authority of the State Bank as being the vehicle by which the Council of Ministers of the USSR ultimately controls the delicate input/output cycle of Soviet economic planning.[8]

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6. Katoff, op. cit., p. 64; Zlatopolsky, op. cit., p. 113.

7. Katoff, op. cit., p. 63.

8. H. Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), p. 241.

Katoff describes the Soviet budgetary system as one in which all major economic targets are originated by a small group within the CPSU whose directions are passed on to lower levels for implementation.[9] The principle of democratic centralism is used by the party to control the lower echelons of the government and the economy. Accordingly, the actual amount of money or credits passing through the hands of the lower levels of government is not a clear indication of power or influence. In this manner the central government has delegated much of the administration for the bureaucratic task of allocating resources to the lower levels of the government but has retained control primarily in the central government and the CPSU.[10]

Though budgets are exclusively the work of the upper echelons of the central government and party, they are not the most crucial parts of the economic system. Bor categorizes the budget as being only the pivot of the system and only a reflection of the plans which were previously formulated.[11] Planning is important in Soviet federalism because its responsibility is to maintain the economic system. If planning is done openly and all levels of government are treated with some degree of equality, then policies should be judged on their own economic validity.

Central Planning

The planning procedure is extremely complicated. To determine its impact on the nationalities problem, it is necessary to understand what

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9. Katoff, op. cit., p. 96-97.

10. Ibid., p. 294.

11. M. Bor, Aims and Methods of Soviet Planning (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 183.

is planned, the nature of the plan, how planning is done, where the control of planning rests, where the control over implementation rests, and what effect, if any, central planning has on economic integration. If one group dominates central planning and discrimination appears to be involved in the planning process, then the result would be an aggravation to the nationalities problem.

Central planning is the base upon which the Soviet economic system operates. Soviet authors emphasize three crucial aspects of their economic system which distinguish it from other systems in the world. These differences are: 1) their economy is a planned, socialist system;[12] 2) a socialist system is such that the means of production are in the hands of the proletariat;[13] 3) the planned socialist system is governed by the scientific theories embodied in democratic centralism.[14]

Plans have a number of very important functions.[15] For example, they are the best device available to forecast target achievements. The plan also provides information on the allocation of resources within a specified period of time. Moreover, since planning is mandatory, the directives from the top become binding on the lower levels of government and growth of the all-union economy is maintained. Though growth is one

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12. Ibid., p. 20-21.

13. Bor, op. cit., p. 21; A. Denisov and M. Kirichenko, "The National Minorities and the Soviet State Structure" Soviet Politics and Government, ed. R. Braham (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 268.

14. Bor, op. cit., p. 55; I. Yevenko, "Planning in the USSR" Soviet Politics and Government, ed. by R. Braham (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 423.

15. P. Bernard, Planning in the Soviet Union, ed. by D. R. Fusfeld, trans. A. Nove (New York: Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 65; E. Zaleski, Planning Reforms in the Soviet Union (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 186.

of the functions of the plan, it is not clear whether it is meant to be a means to an end or an end in itself. By emphasizing growth as an ideal, the central government can legitimize its economic policies by pointing out that the total or average growth rate is in fact maintained. Also, since growth within the entire USSR is the measure of accomplishment, regional disparities tend to be downgraded.

Katoff claims the plan incorporates the economic, military, and political goals of the nation.[16] Of course, the economy is the key sector in planning because of its relationship with all other spheres of Soviet life. Bernard goes further in claiming the nature of Soviet federalism is central planning because almost everything is expressed in some type of plan.[17] It follows that since all production is planned, the choices open to the smooth operation of the economy are severely limited.

Schwartz probably gives one of the better insights into what is planned when he characterizes Soviet economic plans as follows:

> Plans are extremely complex documents resting upon a very detailed and extensive factual knowledge of the existing productive mechanism and its future possibilities in operation.[18]

He suggests all the materials, money, and people necessary to attain specified goals are incorporated and interrelated in the plan. Bernard also characterizes the Soviet system by stating that all that can be planned is planned, and all that cannot be planned is partially planned.[19]

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16. Katoff, op. cit., p. 96.

17. Bernard, op. cit., p. 66.

18. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 117.

19. Bernard, op. cit., p. 64.

Long-term plans are the aggregate goals of the system and are the determinants of future short-term plans. A long-term plan can be for a period of five to fifteen years and, as a rule, such plans are developed for specific growth targets and may account for proposed changes in technology. For example, a long-term plan calling for the electrification of the Soviet Union had to account for the acceptance of the project, its completion, and machines which would be using the electricity. In order to accommodate these necessary changes, it was imperative for a long-term plan to be devised to incorporate electrification gradually enough into Soviet life. The other type of plan which is used is called the short-term plan which may be devised for one month, one year, two years, and for any specific purpose not already incorporated into previous plans.[20] Although plans can very in length and purpose, the following definition by Spulber isolates the common charateristics of all plans:

> An economic plan is both a final result and a beginning. It is the product of compromises among competing goals; the reflection of a basic strategy of how best to allocate resources in order to reach these goals; and the embodiment of certain principles of planning and methods of implementing them. It is, on the other hand, a program of action, combining directives with forecasts concerning investment, output, and employment, and intended to expand a country's productive capacity and to bring about a new pattern of interdependence between sectors of the economy.[21]

The plans tend to be expressed in aggregates but occasionally many detailed accounts are given. The output of production plans would include capital construction while the input financial plans may include cash plans, the budget, and the credit plans.[22] Most financial plans are

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20. Bor, op. cit., p. 39-41.

21. N. Spulber, Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 7.

22. M. Dobb, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966), p. 385.

debit accounts and do not require the actual exchange of money. In long-term plans Bor says needs and possibilities are the two characteristics weighted in all areas of the economy and for all territorial regions in the USSR.[23] In short-term plans input and output balances of the budget are the two most crucial characterizations of the plan. The different areas integrated into the plan have been specified by a number of writers. For example, Schwartz has labelled fourteen areas which are used in planning.[24] These areas include such things as consumer goods, heavy industry, and more speculative areas such as proposed foreign trade, including both imports and exports. Thus the whole economy is incorporated into the plan and the plan itself becomes the essence of development.[25]

The Planning Process

In describing the planning process, the main problem which arises is that of explaining one of the most complicated operations in a concise yet not over-simplified form. The long-term plan is one document which helps to organize and direct the work of millions of people. The targets and dates for completion are set out after the possibilities have been examined in some detail. The task of overseeing the plan is in the hands of the government and the CPSU. The current or yearly plan is really a series of plans of different areas coordinated and placed into one form of action. The plan can be expressed in aggregates but is more commonly expressed in greater detail through the budget. Specific plans

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23. Bor, op. cit., p. 55-62

24. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 101-102.

25. Yevenko, op. cit., p. 421-422.

are those formulated for one area or industry and are given in greater detail, cover the shortest time, are most highly centrally controlled, and most flexible.

Long-term planning occurs in a number of prescribed stages. For example, Bernard has isolated five distinct phases.[26] The planning process usually extends over a long period of time with individual enterprises contributing very little if anything to the final result. The first step in the formulation of the long-term plan is the adoption of the ideas or directions the party and government want the economy to follow. In the second stage Gosplan develops and presents a plan in the form of control figures which reflect the capability of the economy in the next period. Next the planned objectives are adjusted so that the needs and the possibilities of the economy are reconciled with the ideals proposed by the party and the government. Fourth, the Council of Ministers of the central government and the party give their approval to the adjusted plan. In the fifth stage the Supreme Soviet discusses and ratifies the plan. In the formulation of the long-term plans most of the changes are made in steps three and four, but if there is a new development in technology, some minor alterations may also be suggested in step five.

All short-term plans are functions of the current long-term plan because they are integral parts for achieving the long-term goals, but, at the same time, the short-term plans are also separate policies because new needs may have arisen or errors may have been found in the long-term plans.[27] The formulation of short-term plans takes almost a full

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26. Bernard, op. cit., p. 78-79.

27. Bernard, op. cit., p. 89.

year to complete and in some cases even longer.[28] In the formulation of these plans all the people from the enterprises to the top of the party are involved. Current plans are begun in the year preceding their implementation. The first major consideration of the planners is how the next year will fit into the program of the long-term plan.[29] The first draft of the plan is then formulated by Gosplan, the central government, and the party apparatus. In this draft indices are broken down to exact amounts needed, what should be produced, and how bottlenecks can be avoided. At this point the proposed quotas for certain industries are given to the Council of Ministers who then inform the lower levels of their proposed responsibilities. At the same time the lower levels have been examining their own capabilities and present the upper echelons with their own needs and attainable quotas. The plans formulated by the upper and lower echelons are then examined and some changes are made by different ministries. Gosplan then proceeds to draw up a new plan which balances inputs and outputs which have been agreed upon previously. The plan is then sent to the Council of Ministers of the central government and the Politburo where further changes may or may not be enacted. The aggregate goals are then sent back to the different ministries and the specific quotas are distributed to the individual enterprises for implementation. From the time the first directives would be worked out by the central government to the time of fulfillment two years would elapse, one for planning and one for implementation. Diagram III represents the work done by different groups during the planning year. The formulation of short-term plans is thus an extremely involved process consuming a

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28. Ibid., p. 76; Sherman, op. cit., p. 139.

29. Bor, op. cit., p. 37-40.

DIAGRAM III

PREPARATION OF THE YEARLY PLAN



Diagram showing approximate pattern of elaboration of annual plans.

Source: P. Bernard, Planning in the Soviet Union, trans. I. Nove (New York: Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 75.

considerable amount of time and involving all parts of the economic hierarchy. The specific role of the government and the upper echelons of the party is to ensure that the plan corresponds with the goals which have been set by the governing elite.

Control of Planning

From the discussion on planning it is evident that there are three bodies which control the formulation of all central plans. The three bodies are the party, the Council of Ministers, and Gosplan. The relationship among these bodies is significant. Even in official government explanations the position of the party is considered the most important for government planning. Diagram IV is a representation of how, in fact, the party retains control over the whole process. Yevenko characterizes the state and the party as being inseparable bodies controlling the economy.[30] The agencies which formulate plans and compile statistics into delicate input/output equations are all agencies of the central government.[31] The supremacy of the party over the government and the government over the economy is illustrated in Diagram V for the present period and Diagram VI for the (sovnarkhoz) system replaced in 1965. Schwartz states the Soviet economy has been and continues to be administered as if it were one enterprise directly subservient to Moscow.[32] Gosplan is also characterized as the party's arm of control all through the economy.[33] It is evident

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30. Yevenko, op. cit., p. 422.

31. Zlatopolsky, op. cit., p. 82.

32. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 146.

33. Ibid., p. 180.

DIAGRAM IV

PARTY-STATE INTERRELATIONSHIP



Source: A. Denisov and M. Kirichenko, "A System of Soviet State Organs" in Soviet Politics and Government, ed. by R. L. Braham (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 308.

DIAGRAM V

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET UNION



a. Note Sherman's use of the term cell to mean the primary party organization

Source: H. Sherman, The Soviet Economy, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 128.

DIAGRAM VI

BODIES INVOLVED IN PLANNING, 1957 - 65


The Communist Party
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
Council of Ministers of the USSR
State Planning Commission of the USSR
Ministers and Departments
State Committees of the USSR
State Council on Economic Research
Central Statistical Admin. of the USSR
Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic of the Autonomous Republic
Council of Ministers of the Union Republic
State Planning Commission of the Republic
Ministries and Departments
Economic Council
Republican Economic Council
Statistical Board of the Union Republic
Amalgamations (Administrations, Combines, Trusts)
District (City) Soviet
District (City) Executive Committee
District (City) Planning Commission
District Inspector of the Central Statistical Board
Enterprises of Local Industry
Enterprises Under Jurisdiction of Economic Councils
State Farms, Repair and Service Stations, Machine and Tractor Stations, Collective Farms

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Source: I. Yevenko, "Planning in the U.S.S.R." in Soviet Politics and Government, edited by R. L. Braham, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 429.

from the preceding information that the real power in the planning process is the party and the agencies which the party controls.[34]

Control of Implementation

Since the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress the party's dominant position in all aspects of the economy has again been reaffirmed.[35] The party is now responsible not only for suggesting economic policies but is also responsible for the control of actual production in an enterprise. This control is ensured through a number of interrelated structures.[36] In each enterprise the party has its own organizational unit. In these primary party organizations is the grass roots level of the party organization which is directly responsible to the Oblast party organization. Often the manager of an enterprise is also a party member and thus party control of production is further ensured. Though not as obvious today as in the past, the secret police, who are still centrally controlled by the party elite, are also responsible for overseeing many of the actions of the people from the enterprise level up to that of the central agencies in Moscow. Planning, both input and output, is overseen by the party while implementation is controlled through inspection as well as through finance allocation.

The party's control over the economy does not stop with the organization itself. All members of the upper echelons of the government are

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34. R. Braham, "The Organs of State Power and Administration" Soviet Politics and Government, ed. by R. Braham (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 310.

35. Czechoslovakia, 24th Congress of the CPSU, Vol. 9 (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1971), p. 234.

36. G. Carter and J. H. Herz, Major Foreign Powers (5th ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1967), p. 300-306.

party members and are therefore responsible to the party for their actions. If there is a conflict between the party's goals and his loyalty to a republic, a party member must choose the party. This type of conflicting loyalty makes many individuals with other loyalties very skeptical about their role in the system. The conflict in the economic sphere is really not directed against the Soviet economic system itself but against the goals proposed by the Soviet leadership.

Goals

The goals of Soviet leadership, primarily of the party elite, provide the most comprehensive analysis of what is expected from the federal structure. It is these goals which are largely in conflict with what were originally conceived as the goals of federalism and with the aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities. For example, one of these goals envisaged the abolition of federalism after it had provided the economic, social, and political integration of the Soviet state. In this process, the role of the party has been extremely important as it has assumed the responsibility not only for the political functions similar to those of western parties but also for controlling the entire economy and providing the framework for radically altering the life pattern of Soviet citizens. These party goals for the creation of the new Soviet man and the new Soviet state have been channelled through the federal structure of the union.

Because the creation of the new Soviet man is so important the subject will be dealt with separately in the next chapter. What remains in this chapter is the discussion of the goals of political and economic integration as they affect the economic sphere of Soviet life.

The increasing role of the party in all aspects of Soviet life and particularly its economy has made the goal of political integration all important. Although this integration has been met with varying degrees of success in the past, it now appears to be almost complete. The party is a unitary organization and in its years of rule has effectively met any challenge to its authority. The policy of democratic centralism has assured the party elite of control over the functioning of all lower levels of the party organization. With this strict party control the elite has been able to coordinate all other political structures which are overseen by party members. Since the party is affiliated with all professional, trade union, and government organizations the major political organizations have increasingly been tied into the structure and goals of the party.[37] The new powers given to party members in the economy at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress have virtually assured the party's dominance in the economy. Although opposition to the party's control has occurred, this has been largely restricted to individuals, as no organized political force has been able to sustain itself successfully. At this time the party is the sole organized political force formulating policies for the state.

The economic integration of the state has advanced steadily since the establishment of the Soviet Union. The most important aspect responsible for this integration is central planning. The plan is developed by the Soviet leadership and emphasizes production in the whole Soviet Union rather than the aspirations or needs of the separate republics. This emphasis on the total view of the economy has prompted the specialization

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37. For a discussion of the parallel power structures see J. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism," Problems of Communism (March-April, 1972), p. 25-45.

of the economy by region or type of production and has discounted republican boundaries. The capital allocation, wages, and accounting all become centrally controlled and differentiation among republics rests with Moscow.

The merits of integration as practiced in the Soviet Union have been the subject of debate in the west for many years. Though many arguments can be advanced in its favor theoretically, in terms of its impact on the nationalities problem, this argument totally misses the point. What is important to realize is that this integration is the antithesis of the original purpose for the creation of a federal system (although such a goal was clearly evident in Russian Bolshevik policies from the beginning). This type of integration was always viewed with hostility by non-Russians and today's critics, of whom Dzyuba is an example, are calling for a return to the original premises on which non-Russian support was obtained for the creation of the Soviet Union. It is therefore important to realize that integration, beneficial or not, is one determining factor why the implementation of Soviet federalism has aggravated the nationalities problem. The most crucial issue for the future of the Soviet economy is whether or not the leadership can convince the national groups to be content with their position in the total economy of the USSR.

It has been shown that critics of the Soviet economic system within the USSR are beginning to challenge the economic criteria for the development and privileged position of the Russian republic. The economic exploitation of the different parts of the USSR has prompted critics such as Bernard to state that Soviet economic integration is promoting partial

and unequal development.[38] When Bernard compared Ukraine and France, countries of similar size and population, he concluded that Ukraine was run more like a province than the country of France. His study also concluded that Ukraine has fewer factories and is less urbanized than Russia though it is economically more efficient.[39]

According to Bernard and Dzyuba, Soviet economic integration has resulted in making the national groups second class citizens in second class economies.[40] The different minorities are moved around the USSR to fill positions in enterprises while positions in their own republics are filled by the Russians.[41] With the exception of the RSFSR, the economy of most of the republics is less developed, giving the Russians a higher standard of living. In both transportation and communication, which are highly dependent on centrally allocated funds, the systems converge on Moscow, making it easier to travel or communicate to or within the RSFSR than within a specified republic. Economic integration has relegated the republics to the position of little cogs in a giant machine. If the same republics were situated in western Europe, they would be separate countries with their own economies.

One main side effect of this economic integration with the RSFSR in a privileged position is a wide promotion of Russianization. Planning, therefore, not only promotes integration but also results in Russianization

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38. Bernard, op. cit., p. 189-250.

39. Ibid.

40. I. Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1968), p. 109-111.

41. J. Kolasky, Education in Soviet Ukraine (London: Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1968), p. 75.

and the exploitation of non-Russian areas. The study translated in Appendix I reveals that the whole planning system has built-in inequalities which tend to keep the minority groups and their republics in a position below that of the RSFSF. After examining the plans just completed and those proposed for the years up to 1980, Holubnychy demonstrates that exploitation of Ukraine by the central government has been deliberate, and designed to continue for at least the next ten years. Though Ukraine is one of the most economically efficient areas in the USSR, he claims industrialization is to be kept at its present rate of development. His assertion is this: If Soviet economy was run strictly on economic criteria, the transfer of funds from Ukraine would have been replaced or interest paid on the loans, as is being done in Yugoslavia, where capital is also transferred from one part of the state to another. In his view, the transfer of resources from Ukraine to Russia is not economically justifiable because Ukraine has a higher return from labor and capital investment. The exploitation of non-Russian republics is therefore not a chance occurrence but is a built-in policy of the Soviet economy.

It is evident that the economic structure of the Soviet Union does aggravate the nationalities problem. The planning process is structured in such a manner that priorities are given to all-union growth and consequently disregards the aspirations of the separate republics. Centralized planning has also been instrumental in promoting economic integration which further undermines republican authority. Furthermore, the system has promoted the development of the RSFSR at the expense of the more economically efficient areas of the state. This integration and Russianization are both incompatible with the desires of non-Russians and the federal principle. Russianization is hardly consistent with the creation of a new

Soviet state where all peoples and areas were to share equally. The failure of the party to promote the goals desired by the non-Russians has therefore made Soviet federalism, and particularly the economy, an aggravant to the existing nationalities problem.

CHAPTER IV

EFFECTS OF SOCIALIZATION IN THE USSR

As was shown in the previous sections there are a number of diametrically opposed, attainable goals proposed either by the state (central government) on the one hand or by the nationalities on the other. For example, there is the conflict between the federalists and assimilationists on what the theory of federalism is. The centralization of authority in the party and in the all-Union bureaucracy would indicate that the assimilationists have now become the controlling influence in the planning and implementation of the Soviet economy. Since the non-Russian nationalities supported the establishment of a federated Soviet state in 1922, the continuing existence of the nationalities problem in the Soviet state can be at least partially ascribed to the assimilationist policies and to the failure of the system to implement federalism. This chapter will explore how the party and the Soviet government mould their citizenry into the new centralized state. Socialization in the Soviet Union will be examined, concentrating on three major factors: 1) the type of state desired; 2) the agents to be used; and 3) the impact of the state's goals on the different nationalities.

The Type of State Desired

The link between socialization and the impact of Soviet federalism may appear to be tenuous but this is not really the case. According to F. Barghoorn, socialization is essential to the Soviet leadership because it helps to maximize the devotion of the citizenry to the polity and thus

ensuré that the system will continue to flourish.[1] An examination of socialization processes will therefore determine the type of system the citizens are taught to expect and accept. The system proposed and the methods adopted in socialization can also help to explain whether the goals of the state encourage the different nationalities to merge or to flourish. Furthermore, it will reveal the components of the Soviet nationalities policy. Does the state support the flourishing of non-Russian states or aim at their Russification? Although sovietization alone would definitely conform with the aspirations of any communist state, its combination with Russification could easily become an irritant to non-Russian minorities.

Although the terms Russification and sovietization were defined in the introduction, their significance requires further comment here. In spite of the vast amount of literature on Russification, there is still some confusion about its meaning.[2] For the purpose of this study Russification is defined as the conscious effort of the party and government apparatus to promote the use and acceptance of the Russian language, history, culture, and heritage for all peoples in the Soviet Union and thereby psychologically transform the non-Russians into Russians. To implement this policy the party and government must strive to hinder the separate development of the different non-Russian cultures and languages by guile or by force. Of course this process may be extra-legal, but if

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1. F. C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), p. 84.

2. See V. V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities" in Prospects for Soviet Society ed. by A. Kassof, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 143-200; J. Kolasky, Education in the Soviet Ukraine (London: Peter Martin Associates Ltd., 1968).; and I. Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification (London: The Camelot Press, Ltd., 1968).

this study determines that it is being implemented in some way, it will be very apparent why the nationalities problem still exists under Soviet federalism. Analogous to this sovietization is a policy to promote the integration of all peoples in the USSR physically, psychologically, and politically.[3] The primary thrust of sovietization is designed to create a new Soviet man and state based on the brotherhood of the proletariat. The dominance of one bourgeois culture, language, or psychology was rejected by Lenin because the new Soviet man was to be an internationalist supporting all the workers of the world. Sovietization may be opposed by the national groups which compose the Soviet Union because it promotes integration, but it is consistent and legal within the bounds of the constitution of the USSR.

Before examining socialization in the USSR further, it is necessary to investigate the legal rights of the republics and the guarantees which determine whether those rights will be protected. These legal rights appear to be fairly extensive if equated with those of other federal systems. Article 17 of the Soviet constitution guarantees the right of secession of any union republic.[4] The union republics are the only ones with the right of secession because: 1) they are border republics; 2) they have a majority of the population native to the area; 3) they have over a million people living within them; and 4) they are not surrounded on all sides by other territories of the USSR.[5] Diplomatic relations are guaranteed under

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3. Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 159.

4. Soviet Union, Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 23.

5. Soviet Union, O Konstitutsii Soiuza SSR (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), p. 26.

Article 18a of the constitution and the right of republic military units is guaranteed by Article 18b.[6] Language and culture are guaranteed under Article 123 which states that the choice of language belongs to the republics.[7] These rights would appear to indicate that the republics have been given guarantees for their survival and have the option to withdraw from the union at any time, even though they are integral parts of a federation. In practice, however, military units are formed only by the central government and the right of continuing diplomatic relations has been confined to two "states," Belo-Russia and Ukraine. Even then, the diplomatic right has been limited to seats in the U. N. All other diplomatic posts are staffed by people from the central government. Secession is also made difficult because prison terms await anyone who advocates policies which contribute to the weakening of the state.[8] People who have called attention to the inequalities in the Soviet state have been imprisoned for treason, deterring others from making radical statements or requests.[9] The question of language and cultural rights will be treated later in this chapter, but obviously other major rights are also being disregarded. Therefore, many of the constitutional rights which might naturally be considered in implementing the socialization process exist only in theory.

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6. Soviet Union, Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 24.

7. Ibid., Art. 18b.

8. Ibid., Art. 123.

9. For example see V. Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

Socialization in the USSR

The process of interaction through which the individual learns the habits, skills, beliefs, and standards of judgement required for effective participation in social groups is called socialization.[10] Socialization is therefore a process by which the norms and values of a society or group are inculcated into the individual. Political socialization is the acquisition of political attitudes and patterns of behavior within a political system. Since socialization is viewed by the Soviet leadership as a vehicle to attain certain specified goals, the process is never a haphazard one. According to Barghoorn, the party attempts to control the whole process and to make the goals nearly the same for all agents of socialization.[11] The Soviet elite is reluctant to leave anything to chance. Socialization, then, becomes a vehicle to implement only one set of values, those determined by the governing elite. Moreover, since these values and goals become the policies of Soviet federalism, they aggravate the nationalities problem when they fail to correspond to the values and goals of the different minority groups.

Agents and Functions of Socialization in the Soviet Union

Though the goals of Soviet socialization are extremely long-term proposals, the following quotation proves they are very specific:

> Official statements on the aims and spirit of political socialization continue to emphasize the more distant goal of creating the 'new Soviet man.' In this superior type of human being, as the central committee said in its revealing 'thesis' on the educational reform of 1958-1960, 'Spiritual wealth, moral purity,

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10. G. A. Lundberg, et. al., Sociology (3rd. edition; New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 171.

11. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 85.

> and physical perfection will be harmoniously combined.' The 1961 CPSU program contains numerous references to the 'new man' and the means by which he may be 'moulded.'[12]

To understand the manner in which the Soviet elite plans to create this new Soviet man, it is necessary to examine the agents of socialization in the Soviet state. In addition to this, we must study the different programs already implemented by the state which can affect this role. For this reason, agents such as the family or religion, normally not included in a discussion of federalism, must also be considered since they have been affected by the state's nationalities policy. This has further helped to aggravate the nationalities problem.

The Family

The basic agent of socialization is the family because it is responsible for the initial socialization a child receives.[13] Because the Soviet Union experienced rapid political, economic, and social changes following the revolution, the family, generally a conservative force, has at times found it difficult to co-exist with the emerging Soviet society, especially in a situation of very rapid urbanization. Soviet rule initially made a concerted effort to break up the family unit. Divorces and abortions were easily obtained, and child care was almost non-existent. Collectivization and industrialization also helped because families were often separated and members had to conform to societal rather than family needs. As a result, the extended family was gradually replaced by the nuclear family, which could not rely on relatives to socialize the young.

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12. Ibid., p. 85.

13. R. E. Dawson and K. Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1969), p. 203.

Though the above factors have contributed to changing the composition of the family, other factors have even changed the role of family members. The war was most responsible for the liberation of women. As the manpower shortage increased, they were expected to do work normally intended for men.[14] Migrations of families into new parts of the Soviet Union have also created modified pioneering outlooks. Each of these pressures has helped to destroy the traditional place of the family and its position in the socialization process. In evaluating these factors, Rothman concludes that the state has been forced to accept family units which do not become too strong.[15] Barghoorn claims the family is still closely watched because it is one of the major agents impeding Russification.[16] Bacon considers even the nuclear family a force with which the government must still contend.[17] Dawson and Prewitt feel that the family, though passing on many of the accepted norms of Soviet society, is still an extremely potent anti-Soviet force,[18] especially in its opposition to the creation of the new Soviet man.[19]

Thus the family, though weakened, is still a powerful force challenging the goals of Soviet society and, in the case of minorities, this could constitute a latent reaction against policies which threaten their

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14. G. Carter and J. H. Herz, Major Foreign Powers (5th ed.; Harcourt, Grace and World Inc., 1967), p. 319.

15. S. Rothman, European Society and Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs—Merrill, 1970), p. 231-234.

16. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 109.

17. E. Bacon, Central Asians Under Russian Rule (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 15.

18. Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 102.

19. Ibid., p. 123.

own national objectives. It has been found, for example, that policies directed at undermining the family can arouse opposition to the system, especially in rural areas and where there is a large Muslim population.[20]

Peer Groups

Next to education, peer group pressure is the most important vehicle of socialization utilized by the Soviet state. Whenever a person joins a group (and in the Soviet Union all important groups are sanctioned by the party) he is subjected to the influences and pressures inherent in that group. Peer groups are especially effective as socialization agents because of their small numbers and the pressures of conformity within them. They can also be more readily influenced than the family.

The most important peer groups are youth groups because they can socialize the children from pre-school age to adulthood. Almost all children are members of either the Little Octobrists, the Pioneers, or the Komsomol. Among their other goals, these groups have attempted with varying success to instill the value of work and the benefits to be derived from it.[21] Each of these organizations is structured like the party and controlled by it (Diagram VII). Since the groups overlap, continuous socialization is assured. Thus, as the state socializes, the socialized simultaneously socializes others into the norms of the state.[22] Since the whole structure is under party control, the pressures and expected results of

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20. Bacon, op. cit., p. 151-188.

21. J. Couckuyt, "The Komsomol: Socialization and Mobilization," (Unpublished M. A. Dissertation, University of Alberta, 1970), p. 101.

22. Rothman, op. cit., p. 289.

DIAGRAM VII

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY, KOMSOMOL, PIONEERS, AND LITTLE OCTOBRISTS



socialization are heavily influenced by it.[23] In this way, the foundations for the creation of the new Soviet man are laid.

Although the model for the peer groups is the party, other social groupings in the USSR are affected by nationality, religion, or tribal background. Members of the latter may be subjected to pressures to conform to different ideals, though there are constant pressures to conform to the ideals which the party has tried to instill.[24] Groups organized along national lines may pressure a member into accepting the legitimacy of national claims,[25] but the state has many ways of ensuring conformity to its goals. For example, almost all university students either were or still are Komsomol members. In addition, they are usually the recipients of higher wages and have a higher living standard, making them reluctant to choose goals other than those set by the state.

The prevailing philosophy behind group activity is that since man will join groups, the party will help to create them. Once he is in these groups, the pressures of his fellow members will prevail until the individual conforms and accepts the norms of the group to achieve the good life. Understandably, this conformity is directed solely at creating the new Soviet man and is thus instrumental in the sovietization of the individual. Of course, smaller groups organized for more specific purposes and not sanctioned or controlled by the party may socialize their members in directly opposite ways.

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23. P. H. Merkl, Modern Comparative Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), p. 121.

24. Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 182.

25. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 99.

Religion

The idea of studying the role of religion in an atheistic society may appear to be a contradiction but it is important because Soviet policies have created inequalities in the treatment of national religions. The Soviet leadership is avidly anti-religious but it has also seen the possibilities of utilizing the unifying influence of the Russian Orthodox Church[26] to liquidate national religions with deep roots in the past. Soviet religious policy is thus an integral part of its nationalities policy.

To destroy the influence of the church, the Bolshevik government decreed the separation of church and state on January 23, 1918.[27] However, all religions were subjected to rigid control and their functions seriously curtailed. To retain some semblance of power even the Russian Orthodox Church had to bend to the wishes of the state, and, on occasion, to expound the virtues of communism. This study will examine the effect of the policies of the Soviet state on three national religions whose history is bound up with the national aspirations of its peoples.

Though the elimination of religion was one of Lenin's major proposals, a concerted effort to destroy the influence of religion was first adopted by Stalin, the elimination of national churches and non-Russian sects included. The period between 1959 and 1964 produced one

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26. Because the scope and methods used by the state vis-à-vis this religion are similar to those used by the tsars, it has been suggested that religious policies are as much Russian as they are Soviet.

27. V. Gsovski, "Survey of State - Church Relations" Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, eds. A. Inkeles and K. Geiger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 414.

of the strongest anti-religious campaigns in Soviet history,[28] with Judaism experiencing its most virulent effects in the beginning. In 1966 the campaign was directed against the Baptists and their rapid growth rate.[29] The Palaces of Happiness established by the Soviet state to combat the churches were not being received as adequate substitutes for the services provided by churches. Furthermore, underground churches began to appear to counter state pressure against religion. The attack on religion has had more serious repercussions in the non-Russian republics like Ukraine where less than 20 percent of the population of the USSR has had over 50 percent of the open churches.[30]

With the incorporation of Western Ukraine into the USSR, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church came under attack with tactics almost identical to those used in the destruction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the 1930's.[31] To many Ukrainians these efforts seemed to duplicate policies adopted under the Tsar which had succeeded in eliminating the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1689.[32] The first attack on the Greek Catholic Church began with the new partition of Poland in 1939 but efforts were intensified only after the withdrawal of the Germans in 1944. The Greek Catholic Church was accused of being an anti-Soviet organization. Under official

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28. B. R. Bociurkiw, "Religion and Soviet Soviety" Survey (July 1966), p. 64.

29. B.R. Bociurkiw, "Church and State" Survey (January, 1968), p. 31.

30. Bociurkiw, op. cit., p. 65.

31. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

32. B. R. Bociurkiw, "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study of Soviet Church Policy" Canadian Slavonic Papers (VII, 1965).

Soviet guidance a number of bishops and priests met in an assembly which called for the re-union of the church under the Patriarch of Moscow. A counter-church hierarchy was established, and by 1948 the union of the two churches, Catholic and Orthodox, was complete. As the Greek Catholic Church was involved in the Ukrainian struggle against both Russian and Polish expansionist policies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the elimination of the church by the Soviet regime can certainly be regarded as an attempt to prevent history from repeating itself.

The policy of destroying even the vestiges of the two Ukrainian Churches continues even though officially neither supposedly exists. In Kiev a number of churches and monasteries, some dating back to the ninth century, were destroyed on the pretext of constructing buildings and creating parks for the people. Nevertheless, the retention of some of these sites as vacant lots cannot be explained by tardiness in construction as some of the lots have been vacant for ten years. Such destruction of historic monuments leads one to speculate whether they might not be deliberate attempts to destroy symbols, which might clearly indicate the separateness of the Ukrainian and Russian Churches, and memories of the time when the first Metropolitan of Rus resided in Kiev, long before the founding of Moscow.[33] The actions taken against the two churches are clear indications of the regime's attempt to destroy possible sources of opposition against it.

Though Soviet policy has definitely had anti-Ukrainian overtones, Judaism has suffered as much, if not more. The anti-Semitism of the Soviet regime is an extension, after a respite, of similar feeling and policies existing in the Russian empire under the tsars. Attempts to

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33. J. Kolasky, op. cit., p. 65.

discourage Jewish grouping have ranged from extreme persecution to the creation of an autonomous region for the Jews, Birobidzhan, located on the border with China. Since most of the Jews have always lived in the European area of Russia, Belo-Russia and Ukraine, Birobidzhan contained only 8.8% of the Jewish population in 1959.[34]

The Jewish religion has survived in spite of official pressure against it, but fewer young people retain their religion.[35] To demonstrate that religious freedom exists, the regime points to the publication of a new Jewish magazine, Sovyetish Haymland. The demand for the magazine, however, is far greater than the supply.[36] When Khrushchev claimed that the Jews were voluntarily assimilating in the Soviet Union, many Jewish leaders openly contradicted him.[37] Judaism is a threat and an embarrassment to the Soviet regime because it encourages Soviet Jewry to regard themselves as a separate entity with a homeland outside the borders of the Soviet Union. But, since fewer young people are participating Jews, it does appear as if Soviet socialization is at least partially successful, and this is likely one reason a section of the Jewish population has demanded the right to emigrate. Soviet religious policy has caused the Jews to become part of the nationalities problem, even though they do not have their own "nation" within the Soviet Union.

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34. W. Korey, "The Legal Position of the Jewish Community of the Soviet Union" Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union ed. E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 319.

35. R. V. Tucker, "Religious Revival in Russia?" Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, eds. A. Inkeles and K. Geiger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 427.

36. Korey, op. cit., p. 326.

37. Ibid., p. 324.

The second largest religious group in the USSR are the Muslims. The Muslims live mostly in central Asia where they formed nomadic societies prior to the revolution. Social and economic changes which have occurred among them since 1917 have been greater than those within other groups. Although the Muslims come from different and previously warring national groups, their religious bond is more important than is their national differences.

Under Soviet rule, a number of fundamental changes have occurred in the Muslim community.[38] The pilgrimage to Mecca, an indispensable part of their religion, is no longer possible under Soviet law. The Arabic script which is the vehicle of communication in the Muslim world has also been replaced by the Cyrillic script. Forced emigration of Russians and Ukrainians into Muslim areas has destroyed the pre-revolutionary balance of population. Antagonism has been aroused because of the forced collectivization of many nomads into the confines of agriculture. Finally, territorial changes have also occurred, separating groups which have lived close together and who now must associate with groups who historically may have been their enemies. The Muslims, like other national minorities, must enter into groupings that negate their individuality. Compulsory army training, party membership, and other state-directed organizations necessitate that the Muslim learn Russian to prosper or just survive.[39]

Immediately after the revolution there was an effort to involve all the nationalities in governing the new Soviet state. The nationalities were given limited control over their own affairs. However, this policy

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38. Rothman, op. cit., p. 222; G. Wheeler, Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 37.

39. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 34.

was abandoned more quickly with the Muslims than with any other national group. Accused of being too slow, too hard to handle, and at fault for many irresponsible changes,[40] Islam was characterized by one Russian official as more dangerous to the Soviet state than any Christian religion.[41] Islam is regarded as too traditional, determined to transmit its native language and culture. Islam has been and still remains nationalistic and is thereby anti-Russian and anti-Soviet.

The three religious groups which we have mentioned have several common characteristics. As national religious groupings, they were or still are instrumental in opposing Soviet pressure to conform to the new norms of the Soviet state. The Ukrainian churches have been destroyed, but socialization within the other two religions still retains part of the anti-Soviet sentiment and therefore must be watched by the state. Further restrictions of their religious beliefs, however, may be opposed by these three main groups. Sovietization, in particular, directed as it is at destroying all forms of religion, will be opposed by some national religions, especially the Muslims, but it is not the major aggravant. More irritating is the assimilationist view of Soviet federalism. The assimilationists help to maintain the Russian Orthodox Church, indicating that the state would prefer religious people to join it rather than other national religions. This church has therefore been partially retained because it has been and still can be used as a method of Russification. Not surprisingly, it is

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40. S. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 20; Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 12-19.

41. Wheeler, op. cit., p. 34.

this part of Soviet religious policy which has been attacked most strenuously by the nationalities discussed.

Education

The schools are one of the best agents for political socialization in the USSR. Since the separation of church and state, they have come under the sole control of the state. Both the central and republican governments have some control over the financing of education (Chapter II), but, with the help of trade unions, the party controls all education.[42] Thus, in spite of constitutional guarantees for some republican control, the practice of Soviet federalism has been to delegate this control elsewhere. The school system is highly centralized and structured, and the textbooks used in different republics are the same although they may be written in different languages.[43]

School systems everywhere teach language and culture, the basic norms of society, and the knowledge essential for future occupational needs. The Soviet educational system, however, is much more encompassing because it is the main agency of political socialization in the USSR.[44] The final goal of this schooling is indoctrination to train and produce the new Soviet man.[45] At the lower levels this is done by instilling Soviet loyalties and patriotism into the students; at higher levels the writings of Marx and Lenin are studied. All people from the tillers of the soil in

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42. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 86.

43. Rothman, op. cit., p. 254.

44. Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 84.

45. Rothman, op. cit., p. 254; Merkl, op. cit., p. 120.

Turkistan to the ruling elite in Moscow have been exposed to the prevailing ideology of the party. The schools are responsible for creating a literate population who have undergone political indoctrination and training and can function in the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy.[46]

However, there are a number of distinct features of the Soviet school system which contribute to the nationalities problem and, when implemented, aggravate it. To many non-Russian nationalities the most negative feature of the Soviet school system was the adoption of Thesis 19. This policy, introduced by Khrushchev, sparked a long and bitter debate both within and outside of the Soviet Union. The central theme of Thesis 19 was that the parents of a child could decide whether the child was to attend a Russian school or a school whose language was that of the republic. Previous to this, students had to take the language of the republic and the Russian language. Now, children of a Russian family which moved to Ukraine, for example, no longer had to learn Ukrainian because it was not obligatory. The controversy continued for two years because the different national minorities argued that Russian would replace the national languages as it was easier to get a job with a knowledge of Russian. Viewed by the minorities as an overt attempt by the central government to support the assimilationists in destroying the different national languages,[47] the central government decided not to enforce this policy itself but allowed

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46. Carter, op. cit., p. 316.

47. J. Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Continuity and Change?" In Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by E. Goldhagen (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 127.

the different republics to implement it. This was done, however, only after many protesting officials had been replaced.

Since the 1930's Russian has been the compulsory second language in schools, a policy which contradicts Lenin's pronouncement in 1917 that there should not be one state language.[48] To him, the proponents of a one-language state were great-power of great-Russian chauvinists.[49] The realities of the situation, however, are that Russian is spoken everywhere in the USSR and therefore it is not unusual for a Kolkhoz boss in Ukraine to be a Russian.[50] It appears that most higher education, most conferences, and most economic directives are now given in the Russian language.[51] In education it is these assimilationist policies favoring Russian which aggravate the nationalities problem.

Language and Culture

One result of Soviet schools favoring Russian language and culture has been the slow but steady destruction of other national languages and cultures. Modern history books in the USSR portray tsarist conquests as being good and progressive steps.[52] Nationalities conquered by the tsarist armies are being taught the great benefits which these conquests have brought them. This new policy runs counter to all of Lenin's writings.

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48. J. Hazard, "The Soviet Federal System" in Soviet Politics and Government, ed. by R. Braham (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 301.

49. Kolasky, op. cit., p. 27.

50. Hazard, op. cit., p. 301.

51. Kolasky, op. cit., pp. 24-26.

52. R. Pipes, "Forces of Nationalism" Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII (January-February, 1964), p. 4.

To him, the conditions in the tsarist period were so terrible that one of the first tasks for his new government was to obliterate the years of wrong-doing by the tsars. An example of the promotion of the Russian past is seen in Irkutsk, where a tsarist commemorative monument praises the glorious work done by three Russian generals who conquered the area. Today's leaders have not altered the monument in any way, and the tsarist eagle facing China on the monument was once a minor problem in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is true that some national heroes of the different minorities have gained prominence and their works have been translated into Russian. One of Ukraine's leading historical writers, Taras Shevchenko, has won Soviet support as a progressive individual. A university has been named after him at Kiev. Ironically, however, a student of this institution was dismissed and disciplined for reading a poem by Shevchenko in Ukrainian at a gathering at the university.[53]

A former member of the Canadian communist party, J. Kolasky, has compiled a number of first-hand incidents and documents to show the state of education and culture in the Ukrainian SSR. He observed that almost all reference books in schools are in Russian, publishing and teaching in the Russian language is disproportionate to the percentage of Russians in Ukraine, and the number of Russian specialists in Ukraine is unwarranted because the educated Ukrainians working elsewhere in the USSR could have filled these positions. In Ukraine since 1966 Kommunist Ukrayiny has had both its Russian and Ukrainian editions published in equal numbers, even though the percentage of Russians in the population is only

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53. Kolasky, op. cit., pp. 83-85.

about one-fifth that of the Ukrainians.[54] Also, passes, tickets, posters, and the names of buildings in Ukraine have increasingly been written in Russian.[55]

A common reaction of Russians in Ukraine to the Ukrainians is an open contempt for Ukrainian history, language, and for them as a people. One Russian is reported to have accused the different republics of changing the Russian language, a breach of the principles of the Soviet state.[56] Ornstein suggests that because of official and economic pressures, the Russian language will emerge as the main or even only language in the USSR.[57] Although his examples are valid and substantiated, it does not alter the fact that a concerted effort by the state to encourage the use of different languages would help eliminate at least part of the nationalities problem. The Russian language is being taught in all schools of the USSR but practices in other countries indicate it need not be the only language granted such privileges.[58]

Culturally, the Soviet regime has used the schools and forced migrations to dilute the strength of national minorities and to control the development of present culture.[59] Many past and present cultural developments have either been banned or are produced in limited circulation. The

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54. Ibid., p. 23.

55. Ibid., p. 54.

56. Ornstein, op. cit., p. 124.

57. Ibid., pp. 135-138.

58. Countries such as Switzerland, Canada, and Yugoslavia all make allowances for the use and teaching of more than one state language.

59. Carter, op. cit., pp. 230-231; Y. Bilinsky, Second Soviet Republic (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 153.

use of force or sanctions has stopped the publication and distribution of many literary works. Censors play a big part in assuring that cultural development is controlled.[60] The pressure by the state has not stopped people from writing material which is considered by the state to be subversive, but it has limited the distribution of these works even if original manuscripts (samizdat) are passed from person to person.

Culturally and linguistically, the Soviet Union appears to be moving toward the development of one language and one culture. The success of these changes will depend upon the effectiveness of the pressures the state can exert. Any minority not supporting or conforming with the accepted norms will be treated as a subversive element. The impetus of the state's policies is not Leninist and since it is counter to the aspirations of many nationalities, it has contributed and will continue to contribute to the nationalities problem.

Other Socializing Agents

Another important agent of socialization is the mass media. The mass media present only the official view on subjects because the press, radio, television, and cinema are all controlled by and are instruments of the party.[61] News stories carried by the press within and outside the USSR are usually provided by Tass, the government information agency which

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60. The extent of censors' interference and complete reliance on the party line was shown in the contents of criticisms Solzhenitsyn received for his new novel August 1914. One of the reasons why the novel is not to be published in the Soviet Union is that God is to be written in the lower case letters and the KGB is to be capitalized. (Time, June 21, 1971, p. 25.)

61. Carter, op. cit., pp. 242-243.

collects and distributes accepted stories.[62] To ensure that the mass media present the official view, the leadership has created two agencies: Blavlit and Agitprop.[63] Glavlit is responsible for censoring material distributed by the mass media in the USSR. Each publication or program presented must be approved or accepted by one or two censors who then become responsible for its contents. Agitprop is concerned with agitation, which means pressuring the workers to accomplish a desired task, or to propagandize, which means explaining the party line.[64] To accomplish its tasks Agitprop uses the mass media and also conducts seminars or workshops (adult education classes) in industries and offices. In this way socialization by the mass media is meant to promote and ensure the obedience of the population to the leadership.

Socialization: An Appraisal

All avenues of socialization are either controlled or heavily influenced by the state. The state has tried to make all the agents of political socialization train the citizenry to fit their roles in the system and to legitimize the regime by getting the people to accept the state's goals as their own.[65] The official Soviet position on socialization is that it is responsible for creating the new Soviet man and to help build the new Soviet state. Critics of the system, however, main-

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62. Ibid., p. 242.

63. The establishment of these parallel power structures as a check on one another can be found in the economy, the government, or any agency whose responsibilities may make the leadership sensitive about having proper control exercised by responsible people.

64. Carter, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

65. A. G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 115-116.

tain Russification and not sovietization is the major goal of Soviet federalism and thus socialization reflects the state's nationalities policy.

It can be argued that socialization can be either a unifying or divisive process. However, this is not true of the Soviet Union. Through its brand of socialization the goals of its society have become instilled in varying degrees into the minds of most of its citizens. The process has not only sovietized or Russified the population but has also become the major factor in determining what the citizenry may expect or perceive as Soviet federalism. Although it would be most forceful for our analysis to equate socialization with either sovietization or Russification, this is not possible as there are elements of both in the process. However, we can determine the major policies which aggravate the nationalities problem. Some critics have questioned both the sovietization and Russification policies of the state as each in its own way threatens the development of the cultures and languages of the republics. The attacks on sovietization, however, can have no legal basis, though there are legal precedents for attacks against Russification.

The first goal of socialization to be evaluated is sovietization. This goal has been an integral part of Soviet state theory since Lenin's time. In altering Marx's theory of socialist revolution, Lenin recognized that his vanguard would have to become responsible for directing the conversion of the masses into socialist men. This policy of directing the masses has never been abandoned though its emphasis has varied from time to time. The nationalities policy was instituted initially to alleviate problems inherited from tsarist rule and was to have been one of the major instruments for the transformation of society. The nationalities were to become the major forums through which the new society was to be explained

in the language of the republic concerned. Nevertheless, under pressure from the assimilationists this solution was quickly abandoned to be replaced by the new theory that the primary task of society was the socialization of the new Soviet man. Through the state-controlled socialization process the citizenry were then directed to become internationalists, socialists, and defenders of the morals and ethnics of communist movements. Sovietization became anti-national and hostile to national aspirations. As an obvious corollary it also constituted a negation to any form of federalism. The various nationalities immediately recognized it as an attempt to destroy their basic rights. Unfortunately, they can do little because sovietization was not only legal but a logical outgrowth of the state's proposed goals. Still, the major fear of the nationalities was not sovietization but Russification, which followed as a natural corollary to the seemingly more neutral connotations of sovietization policies.

The major cause of resentment among nationalities is Russification. Russification has been and continues to be the main aggravant to relationships between the constituent republics and the central government. Barghoorn claims that the Soviet state through its nationalities policy has attempted to enforce unity over an area known for its diversity,[66] thus indicating that assimilation and not internationalism is its dominant aim.[67] This Russification trend, though resented by the nationalities, is also the main component of most socialization efforts. The policies adopted by the party to gain control of the socialization process, with the aim of negating or neutralizing the older, more anti-Soviet agents of

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66. Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 82-82.

67. Ibid.

socialization, confirm the view that these policies were not arrived at by accident but were predetermined. This Russification trend can be recognized everywhere but it is most evident in the areas of religion, education, forced emigration, and, to a lesser extent, in the control over other organizations or institutions.

The family is one institution which has been singled out for attack. Policies directed toward the break-up of the family are being implemented throughout the USSR because the family is a conservative force. This cannot be seen as part of a Russification attempt because Russian families are subjected to the same treatment. However, the break-up of families which are not Russian makes Russification more effective because non-Russian families cannot as easily preserve their uniqueness.

There is also a concerted effort made to have people join one of the major state sponsored organizations. These organizations not only give members political training but are also an effective method for members to keep one another under surveillance lest some member fail to live up to the norms of the state. An offender can be tried by the state and his peers in what is known as a people's court. If a student riots, the student and his parents are counselled on their failures.[68] The peer groups can thus be vehicles to enforce Russification in addition to being effective means to promote and defend the new Soviet society.

Education has become the most obvious and effective means of promoting Russification. In the same grades throughout the USSR all students are taught the same courses and use the same books. Ordinary books are most often in the language of the republic but almost all reference or

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68. Meyer, op. cit., pp. 350-352.

technical books are available only in Russian. The history of the USSR is taught not from its inception in 1924 but from the years of the "progressive expansion" of the tsarist empire. On the other hand, the histories of the different nationalities are largely ignored. The Russian language is now the major means of communication. Ostensibly for the common good of the Soviet state, the Russian language is becoming as prevalent in Kiev as it is in any Russian city. Because so many Russians are in key positions in Ukraine, the Russian language has become a necessity if one wants to get ahead. The "mayor" of Kiev and many of his staff are Russian and do not speak Ukrainian.[69] These Russians manifest an open contempt for Ukraine and its uniqueness. As a consequence, Drahomanov and Hrushevsky are not even studied in Ukraine even though both of them have played an important part in its resurgence.[70] The superiority of Russian culture and people is being propagated in the schools and frequently propagandized in the press. Education is therefore being used to Russify the languages, cultures, histories, and societies of the non-Russian peoples.

Currently the religious policy of the USSR appears to be keeping anti-religious propaganda to a minimum, but it can be revitalized at any time. The separate Ukrainian churches have been destroyed and the future of all other religions, especially the national ones, seems to be threatened as well. The Soviets would like to see all religions destroyed so

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69. Kolasky, op. cit., p. 11.

70. Both of these men contributed to both the cultural and political growth of Ukraine. Hrushevsky, for example, is regarded as Ukraines's best historian in addition to his being a member of the Rada during Ukraine's independence.

that there would be no conflict with strong religious communities. Since this may not be possible for some time, the Russian Orthodox Church has had and will continue to have state support because it teaches its followers to give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's. Soviet religious policy is one determined to eradicate religion, hoping that people will transfer their faith to the future well-being of the Soviet state and its accomplishments. Failing in this, they will at least attempt to Russify the different sects.

In theory, socialization is directed at sovietizing society but in practice its major thrust is toward Russification. One policy of the regime is the forced migration of peoples which results in diluting the strength of the national minorities. This modern type of diaspora has seen huge numbers of people resettled throughout the USSR. Once outside their republics, they lose their identities as members of their national group. Only the Russians have their language rights guaranteed no matter where they move in the USSR. The effect of these migrations can be studied from the comparison of population figures of Ukrainians and Russians. In 1913 census figures indicate that there were 37 million Ukrainians in Tsarist Russia. In 1959 there were still only 37 million Ukrainians. Although they suffered huge losses in the two world wars and the famine of 1930, these figures still show that a large number of Ukrainians have been Russified. This proposition becomes clearer when we discover from the census figures that the number of Russians from 1897 to 1959 had grown from 55.4 million to 114.1 million, although the Russians had experienced even greater losses in population during the same period.[71]

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71. Dzyuba, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

As the population growth and the size of families in the two countries have been reported to be about the same, the population differences can only be explained through the policy of Russification continuing from tsarist times to the present day.

Through the socialization process the regime has developed one of the best means to control and Russify the different national minorities. Not only has it promoted and legitimized the Russian language, history, and culture through the USSR, but it has also been responsible for the persecution and even liquidation of minority languages, cultures, religions, and histories. However, Russification has also provoked resistance among the nationalities and it would appear from the number of dissenters risking jail terms that this policy will now be challenged more extensively. Of course, this challenge may be a last attempt by the national minorities to protect their uniqueness, and if they fail, the nationalities problem will disappear and the USSR could become a homogeneous country. If a liberalization program does emerge, the family and certain religious groups may be able to offset the Russification policy in effect since Stalin consolidated his power. Nevertheless, without some liberalization the major service of socialization will be the Russification of the population into the party's mould of the new Soviet man. The Soviet state which was founded on the concept of "national in form and Socialist in content" has become socialist in form and national (Russian) in content. The socialization process in the Soviet Union has been responsible in many ways for the continuing nationality problem. Through socialization the Soviet youth have been exposed to the elite's view of the state. This view negates the concepts of federalisms developed by the Bolsheviks and the nationalities in the 1920's. The promotion of Russian in Soviet

socialization and its assimilationist view of Soviet federalism has been instrumental in undermining the creation of a true federal state and consequently has become one of the major policies of Soviet federalism responsible for the continued national problem.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study has examined some of the conditions in Soviet federalism which aggravate the nationalities problem. It has also pointed out that problems created by the state are not necessarily the result of its being communist. The high degree of centralization is also a factor, one which, in fact, makes it difficult to classify the Soviet Union as a federal state in the western sense. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to determine whether federalism, as practised in the west, could work in the Soviet Union. Not only is the high degree of centralization eroding the last vestiges of federalism, but it is also the chief factor in promoting Russification, the major irritant to the various nationalities. In commenting on this opposition among large national groups, especially the Muslim and Turkish peoples, some authors contend that further centralization will alienate these people even more and lead to an eventual confrontation with Moscow.[1] Instead of seeking means to placate this opposition, however, the ruling elite is seeking to centralize government functions even more.[2] At present, confrontation does not appear to be imminent, but it could occur if the problem is ignored by the Soviet leadership.

Though the central government is fully aware of the problems its policies are creating, it has still to relent in its purpose of building

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1. M. Rywkin, "Moscow Versus the Minority Nationalities: Trends for the New Decade" Bulletin (October, 1970), p. 22.

2. K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 238-239.

a particular brand of communism in a unified state. It has recently become very sensitive about its policies, defending them at great length.

> After years of immobility, the national issue in the Soviet Union is at least entering a new stage. This does not mean that the nationality policy of the government is changing or that long established principles are being altered; no radical reforms of administrative practices are in view; the official dogma is not being discarded. Nevertheless, Moscow is going over to the defensive, arguing every issue raised by Western critics while continuing to air their views, publishing numerous explanatory brochures, quoting and misquoting Lenin endlessly, consciously and unconsciously creating an atmosphere of commotion around the whole question of nationalities in the Soviet Union.[3]

The centralization policy of the present elite can in many cases be described only in terms of Russification: a deliberate attempt to mould the non-Russian people into Russians. Long-term plans and specific budget allocations favor the Russian republic economically. This favoritism extends also to Russians living in various republics, with certain government policies planned to give them a disproportionate share of the benefits to be derived from the Soviet brand of federalism. Politically, the structure favors Russians or Russified peoples partly because of their numbers and partly because the system has really operated as an extension of the Russian republic. The Russian language, people, and culture have all held a privileged position since the time of Stalin. Stalin's postwar toast to the Russian people and their valor has been cited as an example of this position in his time but the statement could also reflect the present leaders' views because policies have not changed appreciably since then. These Russification policies should not be regarded as a reflection of the evils of communism since identical courses of action were followed by

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3. Rywkin, op. cit., p. 14.

the tsarist regimes during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is impossible to determine what support they have in the USSR but many Russians and non-Russians alike condemn them as being contrary to Lenin's theory and, accordingly, contrary to the founding principles of the Soviet Union. The only true nation which exists in the USSR at this time is the RSFSR; others exist in name only.

Russification is not a haphazard program but a carefully constructed policy of the state. Within its scope the nationalities policy is the state's blueprint for implementing Russification. To this end the Soviet leadership, maintains that the USSR is to remain a federal state not to protect national boundaries but to provide a facade behind which centralization can be more easily effected.

The communist party has always had a nationalities policy but it has undergone numerous changes since its first introduction. Before the communists seized power in 1917, the policy was very liberal because the party was trying to convince the different national groups to join in the struggle against the tsar. The initial years of Soviet rule were also characterized by a liberal nationalities policy and Lenin branded its opponents Great Power Chauvinists.[4] Stalin also continued the practice of allowing many nationals into the government until he was in firm control of its apparatus. From then until his death, he gave the Russians a privileged position. In the immediate post-Stalin era liberalization again set in and men like Beria actively campaigned for the support of the national groups and offered to change those policies which discriminated against non-Russians. With the reform of education in the late

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4. G. Wheeler, Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 21.

1950's the nationalities policy became Stalinist again, and the return to a hard line produced an interesting paradox. The state had educated and trained a new set of intelligentsia for each republic but deprived them of power after assigning them to their positions. The nationalities policy and the federal structure of the Soviet state remained a screen behind which economic, social, and political integration could be instituted.

The present official nationalities policy is fairly difficult to ascertain but it appears not to have changed appreciably since the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU.[5] During this Congress a number of official pronouncements indicated that the party's goal was the achievement of a unified, homogeneous state. The borders between republics were said to be losing their significance and the republics, by drawing closer together, would eventually merge into one unified body. To ensure the emergence of this new unit, it was important to continue the all-round economic and cultural developments which would ensure the unity and strength of the nation; to develop the new socialist culture; and to help mould the nationalities into one. The whole program stresses the progressive merging of the different national groups into one, new Soviet state and is a negation of federalism.

The most difficult decision to make about Soviet federalism and the place of national republics within it is what autonomy the republics still retain. Melnyk maintains that the non-Russian republics are being exploited and that the nationalities policy is just a method to keep con-

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5. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Crosscurrents Press, Inc., 1961), p. 102-125.

trol over the various areas.[6] Meyer argues that the same policy is directed toward the central control of all political, economic, and social resources in the state.[7] Both views emphasize the growing centralization in the USSR and the abandonment of all federal principles. They help to explain why Soviet federalism, from the viewpoint of western scholars, appears to be more unitary than federal. Federalism in a western sense is non-existent in the USSR. Instead, the highly centralized party and government apparatus have eroded all the major areas of republic autonomy. It is this centralization and not federalism which is the cause of the nationalities problem.

This thesis has demonstrated that Soviet federalism has three related functions: to build a single state which is economically and militarily strong; to promote the development of a homogeneous society; and to create a new culture based on Russia and its people. As the existence of separate nationalities hinders the rapid attainment of these goals, it has become necessary that they be regimented as closely as they had been under Stalin. For some reason, however, although economic, political, and social integration is still being promoted, official pronouncements no longer specify a target date for total integration.

In spite of the policies directed against nationalities, it still appears as if the nationalities problem will be an inherent feature of Soviet federalism for some time. Nationalism still exists in the non-Russian republics and does counter Russification to some degree. Soviet

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6. Z. L. Melnyk, Soviet Capital Formation: Ukraine 1928/29-1932 (Munich: Ukrainian Free University Press, 1965).

7. A. G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation (New York: Random House Inc., 1965), p. 446-447.

leadership must find a solution to the nationalities problem because Russians are becoming a minority in numbers and, by the time China's potential has been realized, the population of the Asian republics may become an adequate force to counter Russian rule. Any attempt to resolve the nationalities problem by force or coercion could result in armed resistance. A possible solution which might be acceptable to both sides is a return to Soviet federalism along the lines proposed by Lenin fifty years ago. However, it is very doubtful if the present leadership would be willing to relinquish their power and allow any liberalization of policies. The future of Russian federalism remains uncertain.

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APPENDIX I

UKRAINIAN FREE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN U.S.A.

Economics Section

Meeting of March 27, 1971 - Report by V. Holubnychy

"Report on the Econometric Model of Ukraine 1959-68"

In the Ukrainian section of the Scientific and Research Institute of Planning and Normativization attached to State Planning of the USSR, Soviet economists have calculated a model of the economic growth of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic for the ten-year period, 1959-1968. The model has been published in "Planovomu Khozaystvi", (Planned Economy), Moscow, No. II, 1970.

The model is composed of a system of eleven linear equations, the figures being used as a basis being largely from the statistical year-books of this ten-year period. On the basis of the model the researchers of this institute projected a five-year plan for the years 1971-75 and the outlook further until 1980. These materials were given to the URSR State Planning for utilization. The model turned out to be very accurate as the probability of error amounted to only 2.1% (the extent of the average statistical error came to only 2.1%).

In addition to the comparison of social productivity with and national income, consisting of savings funds and consumption expenditures etc., the most interesting item of this model is the comparison of the volume of production in the national income of the URSR with the volume of consumption in the territory of the republic. The average difference in these figures for the ten-year period stands at 13%.

This astoundingly large difference is expressed in the statistics of the whole Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an average of 1.4% and officially explained as an "imbalance of external trade" (loss and balance of external trade). If we accept the all-union figures as the correct figures and add 2.1% of the theoretical probability of error of the model it appears that the model still does not explain the additional 9.5% of difference. We question where this 9.5% of the Ukrainian national income produced on its territory disappears?

The total national income of the URSR is approximately 49,000,000,000 karbovantsi. The 9.5% which is not consumed on its territory amounts to 4.6 billion kr. It appears that this must be the same average amount of taxes which were not returned to Ukraine by Moscow according to the research of the Academy of Sciences of the URSR in "Natsionalny Dokhod URSR" (National Income of URSR), Kyjiw, 1963, taken without return from Ukraine in 1959-61.

If this is the correct interpretation, then the model reveals that the Ukrainian imbalance in favor of the USSR in their reciprocal financial arrangements is not accidental. It existed not only in 1959-61, but also in the years 1959-68, and is planned for the future until 1980. Therefore, the financial exploitation of Ukraine by the USSR is planned in advance. It is systematic and has a wide range. The consequences of this policy are revealed, for instance, in the five-year plan for 1971-75 where it is planned that the growth of the Ukrainian industry should be only 38-41% and the growth of that in the USSR is planned to be 44-47%.

Since the product of labor and capital investment of basis funds in Ukraine is, on the average, higher than those in Russia, the transfer of resources from Ukraine to Russia cannot be justified economically. Not

only does Ukraine suffer from such a policy but also the whole of the USSR. If Siberia needs to be developed with Ukrainian resources then the proper economic policy should be the borrowing of capital from Ukraine with the promise of return and also a payment of interest. On such solid principles, for instance, are reciprocal financial arrangements made between the republics of Jugo-Slavia, and also between regions of many other countries.